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Abstract

Technical communication certificates are offered by many colleges

and universities as an alternative to a full undergraduate or graduate degree
in the field. Despite certificates’ increasing popularity in recent years,
however, surprisingly little commentary exists about them within the

scholarly literature. In this work, I describe a survey of certificate and

baccalaureate programs that I performed in 2008 in order to develop basic,
descriptive data on programs’ age, size, and graduation rates; departmental
location; curricular requirements; online offerings; and instructor status
and qualifications. In performing this research, I apply recent insights

from neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist critiques of science to
both articulate, and model, a feminist-sophistic methodology. I also

suggest in this work that technical communication certificates can be

theorized as a particularly sophistic credential for a particularly sophistic
field, and I discuss the implications of neosophistic theory for certificate
program design and administration.
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Introduction

Technical communication certificates are offered by many colleges

and universities as an alternative to a full undergraduate or graduate degree
in the field. Certificates typically require only one or two years of

coursework strictly within technical communication, and can typically be
earned while working full time or while seeking another degree.

According to the Council for Programs in Technical and Scientific

Communication (CPTSC) and the Society for Technical Communication
(STC) joint publication Academic Programs in Technical Communication
(third edition), there were 16 programs offering technical writing

certificates in 1985 (qtd. in Shirk et al. 1). In 2008, I was able to identify
at least 89 individual certificate programs, representing a roughly sixfold

increase in number over 23 years. Compared to an approximate tripling of

the number of technical communication programs overall during the same
period, it’s clear that certificate programs are an increasingly popular
means of meeting the demand for skilled technical communicators.
Despite this popularity, however, surprisingly little information or

discussion exists in the scholarly literature specifically about certificates.

This informational and conversational void is unusual, as certificate

programs are potentially located in the middle of several important
conversations in the field of technical communication. With their

apparent vocational emphasis, certificate programs are potentially a site of
conflict “on the issue of training opposed to education, or in other words,

the conflict between theory and practice” (Little, “Designing” 278). With
their role in meeting the needs of local industry, and with their potential
to serve as the locations for academy-industry cooperation, certificate
programs speak to the conversation of who shapes technical

communication programs: academy or industry (Anderson; Bosley,
1

“Collaborative Partnerships”; Bushnell; Coon and Scanlon; Krestas,

Fisher, and Hakos; Yee; Zimmerman). With certificate programs’ role as a
gatekeeper to the profession—that is, the role of “certifying” implicit in
their very name—they also raise questions about what counts as an

appropriate academic preparation for practicing technical communicators
(Shirk 4) and they present a number of significant implications to the
project of professionalizing the field (Savage, “Process” 364–65).
In this dissertation, I describe my efforts to address the

informational void surrounding technical communication certificate
programs by performing a survey of program administrators. By

developing basic, descriptive data on programs’ age, size, and graduation

rates; departmental location; curricular requirements; online offerings; and
instructor status and qualifications, I hope to make way for more situated
and productive dialog in the above scholarly conversations. I also hope to
provide information, considerations, theoretical reflections, and cautions
that are useful for administrators interested in implementing their own

certificate programs. As I conduct the present survey with these research
aims in mind, however, I also engage self-reflexively with a number of
issues concerning epistemology and methodology. Applying recent

insights from neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist critiques of

science, I seek within this study to articulate and model revised practices
for empirical research. As I suggest, by employing a distinctly feministsophistic methodology, this study can respond to contemporary

conversations in the field of technical communication more ethically and

rigorously than by using traditional scientific and academic methods alone.

About Certificates

In 1988, the CPTSC workshop group on certificates advanced the

following definition of a certificate program:
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A certificate is a college or university awarded credential
granted for successful completion of a defined program of
study. Certificates can be awarded at the undergraduate or
the graduate level.
A Technical Communication Certificate differs from a
Masters Degree in two significant ways. First, a Masters
program will require more credit hours and, therefore, a
longer period of study. A Masters program will also
promote more research into the study of the theory of
technical communication. The limited scope of the
Certificate in Technical Communication distinguishes it
from the undergraduate degree in this area. (28)

The workshop group went on to issue the following call for basic research
describing certificates:

We recommend a nationwide survey to gather information
on the content of existing Certificate programs. In addition,
we recommend that [the] CPTSC survey the number of fulltime to part-time to adjunct faculty teaching in Certificate
Programs in Technical Communication to establish a
standard for an appropriate ratio. (28)

Despite this call, however, the scholarly literature specifically on technical
communication certificate programs is confined to only a pair of book
chapters (Little, “Designing”; Nugent, “Looking”) and a dozen or so
CPTSC

presentations (Bosley, “Building”; Bridgeford, “Academic”;

Bridgeford, “Negotiated”; Bridgeford, “Repurposing”; Bridgeford,

“Thoughts”; Little, “Problem”; Little, “Proof”; Nugent, 2006; Pfeiffer;

Rehling; Shirk; Shirk et al.; Worley). Even though they span over 20 years

of scholarship, these works comprise (by my count) fewer than 70 pages of
text.

Among the most in-depth treatments of certificate programs is

Sherry Burgus Little’s 1997 chapter, “Designing Certificate Programs in

Technical Communication.” In this work Little provides a general review
3

and synthesis of information on certificate programs found in the four
editions of Academic Programs in Technical Communication published

between 1976 and 1993. As she notes, certificate programs are diverse in
their charter and construction. Some programs are geared toward those
entering the field, while others are designed to augment the skills of

practicing professionals. Some programs are designed to serve those in
scientific and technical fields specifically, while others are designed to

serve technical communicators more generally. Certificates are offered at
both the undergraduate and graduate levels, and the courses they require
vary widely (276–77). Little further characterizes certificates as flexible
and localized:

They can be modified easily and quickly, adapting to
changing demands, because they are generally monitored
and scrutinized less closely than other kinds of programs.
Because of their flexibility—their content is rarely
mandated by degree requirements of educational
legislation—they can be individuated for students, adapting
to diverse backgrounds and goals. (275)

Little also suggests that certificate programs are comparatively easy to
implement (see also Shirk 2). As she describes, the bureaucratic

machinations required to establish a new degree program can be
considerable:

In most institutions, proposing a degree involves a
staggering amount of paperwork and numerous procedures.
A chain of approvals needs to be won from committees and
administrators at all levels and frequently beyond the local
institution itself to centralized administrations, boards of
trustees, state-level educational approving agencies, and
even state legislators. Such approval processes are timeconsuming, sometimes taking years before a degree comes
into existence. (275)
4

In contrast, certificate programs are much easier to initiate, as oversight for
their creation rarely extends beyond the immediate institution and they

can usually take advantage of courses and resources already in place across
the university (275). For these reasons, certificates can be an attractive

option for emerging programs (see Bridgeford, “Repurposing” 79; Pfeiffer
6; Shirk 1; Worley 110).

In my 2003 study of certificate programs, “Certificate Programs in

Technical Communication: Looking Closer, through Sophistic Eyes,” I
attempt to offer a more systematic response to the CPTSC workshop
group’s call for research into the content and staffing of certificate

programs. In the first part of that study, I closely examine 62 certificate
programs in technical communication in order to characterize them in

terms of their curricular requirements. In the second part of that study, I
perform a survey of certificate program administrators to gauge who

teaches in such programs, the age of such programs, and the relationship
of such programs to local industry. I conclude that certificate program

curricula “are so wildly disparate that no core curriculum can be said to
exist among them.” I also find that certificate programs demonstrate a

concern with the needs of local industry, with most programs recruiting

from local industry, making use of industry advisory boards, or employing
some other means to gather feedback from local industry. However, in
that study I present only limited data about the degrees required of

certificate program instructors, leaving many questions about their status
unanswered.

Although the scholarship on certificate programs is scant, much of

the available commentary expresses a certain wariness about them. For

instance, the CPTSC workshop group’s 1988 call for research implies their
suspicion that certificates are perhaps less ably staffed or of inferior in

quality compared other technical communication programs. Little suggests
5

that the certificate’s relative lack of oversight, its lack of standardization, its
localization, and its curricular diversity could possibly lead to its lack of
acceptance as a valid credential (“Designing” 276; see also Little,

“Problem”). Tracy Bridgeford voices her concern that the label “‘certificate’
could reinforce the ‘vocational ethos’ often attached to our programs and
courses” (“Repurposing” 79). In a 1988 presentation to the CPTSC,

Henrietta Nickels Shirk offers a litany of questions that reflect a general
suspicion toward certificates:

Who should teach in these programs? Should our
instructors have primarily academic backgrounds, should
they be current practitioners in the field, or should the
“ideal” program have a group of instructors who represent
some combination of these different sets of skills? If there
are industry advisory boards for our programs, do they
recommend course content rather than dictate it? And is
this course content balanced with the application of sound
theory and effective teaching strategies? Are our certificate
programs too focused in their content and therefore on the
edge of being parochial? While graduates may meet the
immediate job needs of local industries, will they also be
equally successful […] in other parts of the country? (2–3)

In her own 1998 presentation to the CPTSC, meanwhile, Lu Rehling urges
the council to “contribute to the evolution of certificate programs in our
field by helping to set some standards and publicize some parameters”
(51).

And in their 2007 article “‘Remapping Curricular Geography’: A

Retrospection,” James Porter and Patricia Sullivan implicate certificate
programs, at least tangentially, in the marginalization of professional
writing. They note that professional writing remains the subject of
“indignity and neglect” (16) at many institutions: an indignity

amplified by the number of English departments that start
a professional writing certificate by adding an internship to
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a literature major and by insisting that their hire (notice the
singular) in professional writing have status in literature (or
at least have signed a loyalty oath to the love of it). In other
words, English departments often undermine the
disciplinarity of professional writing by hiring literary folks
to teach it. Unfortunately, this form of colonization
continues at many institutions. (16)

It is clear from these accounts that certificates not only provoke anxiety

about issues of program quality, but that these issues almost immediately

and invariably spill over into a range of important field-wide concerns and
conversations. I take it to be indicative of the centrality and significance of
certificate programs that the limited scholarly commentary about them
touches on such broad issues as:
•

the material and professional status of technical
communication instructors,

•

debates concerning the project of establishing technical

communication as a profession and scholarly discipline (i.e., the
professionalization debates),
•

debates over the establishment of nationwide certification for
technical communication practitioners or instructors,

•

debates over vocationalism and academy-industry
collaboration,

•

concerns over the relationship between theory and practice in
technical communication, and

•

debates over the political and material consequences of

technical communication’s common disciplinary location
within departments of English.

Although I can’t hope to satisfactorily address all of the issues and

anxieties presented by certificate programs in the present research, I do

believe that the basic descriptive data, methodological considerations, and
theoretical reflections that I seek to articulate here can be used to support
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more situated and productive conversation about these increasingly
popular programs.

About the Present Study

Proposing to more fully respond to the CPTSC’s 1988 call for basic

descriptive data regarding certificate program instructors, in 2006 I sought

and won support from the council to perform a mailed survey of certificate
and baccalaureate program administrators. With this research, I attempt to
augment our basic understanding of certificates by answering the
following questions:
•

What is typical of technical communication certificate
programs in terms of their:

o type of department or academic unit,
o age,

o size,

o graduation rates,

o course requirements,

o length to program completion,
o online offerings, and

o internship requirements?

•

To provide a baseline for analysis, what is typical for

baccalaureate programs in terms of the same attributes above?
•

What are the professional qualifications of certificate program
instructors, and how do they compare to the qualifications of
baccalaureate program instructors? These qualifications
include:

o level of academic preparation,
o academic specialization,

o possession of industry or professional experience,
o status as a graduate student, and
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o status as a tenure-track instructor.

•

Do technical communication certificate instructors have more
or less professional status than baccalaureate program
instructors?

Particularly with the air of suspicion surrounding certificates in

terms of their perceived quality and their possible implications for the

material and political status of the field of technical communication, I also
attempt to address the following, more open-ended and theoretical
questions:
•

Given their shorter time to completion and their relative lack

of accreditation and other external oversight, how do certificate
program curricula rank relative to baccalaureate programs?
•

What are the implications of certificate programs for the
disciplinary and professional status of technical

communication? How are certificates poised to impact the
project of professionalizing the field of technical
communication?
•

What theoretical models can help us to situate and to make

sense of certificate programs? In what ways can these models

guide the development and growth of technical communication
programs?

In seeking answers to these questions, I draw on neosophism to

inform my overall approach. As I detail in the next chapter, a sizable and

recent intellectual movement is underway to restore the reputation of the
historically maligned, early Greek sophists. A number of scholars are
turning to these ancient rhetoricians to develop new conceptions of

pedagogy and practice for composition-rhetoric, communication, and
technical communication, among other fields. Particularly after

modernism, neosophistic scholars find new relevance in the sophists’
9

socially engaged, politically potent, and thoroughly rhetorical modes of

teaching and practice. In this study, I seek to join this scholarly movement
by applying neosophistic theory specifically toward the practical and
theoretical questions surrounding certificate programs.

Neosophistic theory informs this study in two key ways. First, I

explore the productive intersections of feminist theory and neosophistic

theory in order to articulate a feminist-sophistic research methodology for
this research. As I describe, such a methodology makes a number of

notable departures from traditional scientific and academic methods in
terms of its epistemic stance and rhetorical style. Second, I use

neosophism as a framework for interpreting the certificate program in

technical communication itself. Sophistic rhetoric, as Gerald J. Savage

notes, can act as a valuable tool for theorizing the professional identity of

the postmodern technical communicator (“Tricksters”). Likewise, I argue,
it proves to be a valuable tool for theorizing technical communication
certificate programs. As I conclude, the certificate in technical

communication can be seen as a particularly sophistic credential for a
particularly sophistic field.

In chapter 1, I set the theoretical scene for this study by describing

neosophistic theory. After characterizing the history of ancient sophists
and the postmodern context that has led to their contemporary

reevaluation, I then describe and situate the present research within the
specific genre of neosophistic appropriation. In chapter 2, I work to

combine the perspectives of neosophistic rhetorical theory and feminist

critiques of science to describe a feminist-sophistic methodology for the

present study, and in chapter 3 I overview the specific strategies I use for

the rhetorical enactment of such a methodology. In chapter 4, I outline my
method for surveying programs in the perhaps more traditional terms of
selecting the sample, composing the survey instrument, and conducting
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the survey itself. And in chapter 5, I present the major results of the survey
and I offer some conclusions and overall theoretical reflections on the
certificate program in technical communication.

11

Chapter 1:
The Sophists, the Postmodern Context, and
Neosophism
At the risk of sounding hackneyed and clichéd, I begin the first

chapter of this work by noting that Webster’s Dictionary (1913) defines

“sophism” as “The doctrine or mode of reasoning practiced by a sophist;

hence, any fallacy designed to deceive.” The American Heritage Dictionary

defines sophism as “A plausible but fallacious argument” or “Deceptive or
fallacious argumentation.” And Webster’s Third International Dictionary
(1961) defines sophism as “an argument that is correct in form or

appearance but is actually invalid; [especially] an argument used for

deception, disputation, or the display of intellectual brilliance,” or more

simply, “specious reasoning.” The everyday understanding of sophism is

decidedly negative: the word is pejorative, equated to deception, chicanery,
and ethical duplicity. Beneath these unflattering definitions, however, lies

more than two millennia of accumulated history, including an intellectual
dispute whose territory is as broad as the foundation of Western
metaphysics itself.

As Susan C. Jarratt notes, the actual, historical sophists at the heart

of these dictionary definitions have been “buried under two millennia of

neglect, an outcome of the passionate condemnation they provoked from
two of their contemporaries who have fared better in the histories, Plato
and Aristotle” (“Rereading” 1; “First Sophists” 67). After modernism,
however, Plato and Aristotle’s reified position within history—not to

mention the foundationalist premises of the intellectual tradition they

advanced—have come under suspicion. This has lead a number of scholars
to recognize the refigurative potential of the early sophists. Gradually,
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these scholars are working to rewrite our definitions of sophism as mere
flattery and chicanery, and are beginning to forge vital connections
between the sophists’ ancient past and our postmodern present.

In this chapter, I attempt to set the overall historical and

theoretical scene for this study by characterizing the contemporary

movement to resurrect and restore the sophists. I begin by briefly outlining
the history of the ancient sophists, and I describe the postmodern context
that has served to draw them back into the purview of serious scholarly

and intellectual consideration. Then, I attempt to situate the present study
among contemporary scholarship on the sophists. In doing so, I outline a
pivotal scholarly debate between the “objectivist” and “rhapsodic”

historiographic approaches (Consigny, Gorgias). I then review a number of
works within the genre of “neosophistic appropriation” (McComiskey,

Gorgias), a scholarly genre made possible by rhapsodic historiography and
dedicated to applying the ancient sophists toward a number of

contemporary issues. Finally, I conclude by describing how the present
study attempts to contribute to this important new genre.

The Ancient Sophists

The sophists were traveling teachers and rhetoricians in ancient

Greece. They were the “visiting professors” of the fifth and fourth
centuries BCE, teaching their students skills that went beyond the

traditional curriculum of grammatikē, mousikē, logistikē, and gumnastikē to

also include preparation for life in the public sphere (Kerferd 17; Matsen
30). The sophists accompanied great historical and cultural change; they
flourished as democracy flourished in ancient Greece (Crome 14; Enos
136; Kerferd 1; Jarratt, Rereading 81). They were travelers, and by no
coincidence, relativists: they understood that “There is no absolute

criterion, divine or human, with which to measure any aspect of reality;
thus there is no certainty beyond the certainty that the world is known
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differently from place to place” (Pullman 53). The sophists invented the

profession of teaching, and they offered their instruction to any man who

was able to pay their fees, regardless of his social status ( Jarratt, Rereading
82, 84).

The term “sophist” itself was initially positive, meaning any “wise

man”; the term “philosopher” too meant simply a “lover of wisdom.” It
wasn’t until the critiques of Plato and his contemporaries during the

fourth century BCE that “sophist” came to be widely seen as pejorative

(Crome 19; McComiskey 3, Jarratt, Rereading 34; Schiappa, Protagoras 4).

In the dialogue of the Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates declares that rhetoric is not
a true art because “it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers

what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to

point to the cause of each thing it offers” (465a). He goes on to analogized
rhetoric to “mere cookery” and to denigrate it as a routine, a knack, and a
false art (462e–463b). Rhetoric, according to Plato, is incapable of

accounting for its own first principles or productive outcomes in the way
that a true art, such as medicine, can (Phaedrus 270b).

In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates advances the distinction between

dialectic (a philosophic search for Truth) and rhetoric (a mere tool for the

dissemination of Truth, as found prior through dialectic) (260d). To Plato,
only a privileged class of philosopher-kings are capable of accessing a
priori Truth through dialectic, and one of rhetoric’s few capacities for

virtue is as an instrument of state control: as a means for philosopher-

kings to convey the Truth to those too inferior to access it on their own

(Black 373–4; Kauffman 106–115). As the lowly, deceptive practices of the
sophists stand opposed to the lofty goals of philosophy and dialectic

(Phaedrus 269b), the sophists remain capable of offering only the merest
appearance of Truth (Gorgias 464b–466a). Combined with no small

amount of slander—Susan Jarratt notes that Plato’s accounts of the
14

sophists “take on almost monstrous qualities of greed, exhibitionism, and
deceit” (“First Sophists” 68; “Rereading” 3)—Plato’s critiques placed
rhetoric and the character of its first teacher-practitioners under an

enduring pall of opprobrium. By casting the previously benign terms

“sophist” and “philosopher” so dramatically into opposition, Plato set the
stage for the lasting condemnation of the sophists through subsequent
history.

At the hands of his famous student Aristotle, Plato’s

foundationalist epistemology evolved subtly, but continued to militate
against the sophists. To be sure, Aristotle is less directly antagonistic

toward them than Plato (Pullman 52; Matsen 30; Poulakos, “Rhetoric”

215) and his theories of rhetoric are in some ways consistent with those of
the sophists (McComiskey, “Toward” 6; McComiskey, Gorgias 6; Allen).

Nonetheless, Aristotle “toes the party line” by characterizing the sophists
as artists of deception (McComiskey, Gorgias 2–3) and by upholding

rhetoric as the undeniably weaker counterpart (antistrophos) to dialectic
(On Rhetoric 1354a). In Sophistical Refutations, for instance, Aristotle

equates sophism with fallacy (165a) and makes persistent attacks on the
sophist’s character, depicting them—much like Plato did—as
opportunistic, greedy, lying quibblers (171b).

Together, Plato and Aristotle were instrumental in forging an

attitude toward the sophists and rhetoric that has served to keep them
historically on the losing sides of the binaries of rhetoric/dialectic and
philosophy/sophistry. As George L. Pullman maintains,

The traditional thinking is that Platonic and Aristotelian
rhetorical theory disciplined the sophists’ extravagant
practices, substantiated their unsubstantiated claims, and
transformed their dithyrambic, magical, poetic discourse
into a logical, rational theory of argumentation. In other
words, Plato and Aristotle transformed mythos into logos.
15

[…] Because the Western intellectual tradition has tended
to lionize Plato and Aristotle and the positive
epistemologies they fostered, the sophists in general and
sophistic rhetoric in particular have been much maligned,
while Plato and Aristotle have largely remained the first
and the last word on legitimate rhetoric. (50–51)

In the historical context of postmodernism, however, this traditional
thinking has begun to be seriously challenged and revised. As Bruce

McComiskey notes, “a new set of conditions emerged during the latter
half of the twentieth century, conditions that enabled the critique of

Plato’s hegemony, foundational epistemologies, and realist rhetorics”

(Gorgias 58). In the following section, I briefly overview the postmodern
context that brought about these conditions.

The Postmodern Context

The latter half of the previous century witnessed the broad

intellectual and cultural disruption known as postmodernism. The advent
of postmodernism has represented a broad disaffection with, and

paradigmatic break from, the tenets of modernism and Enlightenment

humanism. The contours of this break are now largely familiar; many of
postmodernism’s once-radical ideas have become commonplace and its
critiques have gradually evolved and passed unmarked into our culture.
Formerly obscure and abstruse postmodern theory has (to some irony)

been canonized in collections such as the Norton Anthology of Theory and
Criticism (Leitch), and it has become accessible in textbooks such as The
Portable Postmodernist (Berger) and even a comic book (Powell). Once-

polarizing ideas such as the celebration of diversity and alterity are now
the stuff of institutional mission statements. Collaborative, digitally

mediated projects such as Wikipedia embody the social construction of
knowledge without any explicit acknowledgement of a postmodern
theoretical orientation. Meanwhile other digital social networks,
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commons-based peer productions, and “Web 2.0” phenomena subvert
modernist notions of the individual genius in their reliance on

collaboration and the “wisdom of crowds.” To some irony, the success of

postmodern theory has threatened to render its critiques invisible, and it
has become easy to overlook postmodernism’s significance to
contemporary history.

By way of definition—and by way of reminder to its often tacit

presence—I offer a brief review of this movement. While broad in scope
and diverse in its makeup, postmodernism remains a distinct and

characterizable intellectual-historical phenomenon. To Terry Eagleton,

“Postmodernism means the end of modernity, in the sense of those grand
narratives of truth, reason, science, progress and universal emancipation

which are taken to characterize modern thought from the Enlightenment
onwards” (Literary 200). Meanwhile, Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A.
Giroux offer this characterization:

Postmodernism’s refusal of grand narratives, its rejection of
universal reason as a foundation for human affairs, its
decentering of the humanist subject, its radical
problematization of representation, and its celebration of
plurality and the politics of racial, gender, and ethnic
difference have sparked a major debate among
conservatives, liberals, and radicals in an increasingly diverse
number of fields. (61)

Donna Haraway offers a similar characterization of postmodernism, in a
style perhaps more befitting it:

If belief in the stable separation of subjects and objects in
the experimental way of life was one of the defining
stigmata of modernity, the implosion of subjects and objects
in the entities populating the world at the end of the
Second Millennium—and the broad recognition of this
implosion in both technical and popular cultures—are
stigmata of another historical configuration. Many have
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called this configuration “postmodern.” (Modest_Witness
42)

Beyond these characterizations, I identify a handful interrelated

concepts and critiques that are central to postmodernism (and I note some
of their familiar “-isms” and terminologies as well). Postmodernism
entails:

1. a strong skepticism concerning the transparency and
stability of meaning in language (poststructuralism,
Derridian différance and deconstruction);

2. the notion that knowledge is not discovered by individuals
describing a prior and independent reality, but rather

knowledge is developed within—and determined by—social
contexts (social constructionism, Kuhnian paradigm shifts,
Rortyian pragmatism);

3. a recognition that certain concepts have been arbitrarily
privileged over others through history, and that certain

myths play a determining role in culture (logocentrism,
Lyotardian metanarratives/grand narratives);

4. the dissolution of the modernist normative subject, and the
recognition that subjectivities are socially constituted and
are without essentiality (the “death of the subject,”

postcolonialism, the subaltern, the “Culture Wars”); and

5. a rejection of the inviolability of Enlightenment rationality
and the supremacy of scientific knowledge

(antifoundationalism, the “Science Wars,” the Sokal affair,
pragmatism).

As these notions migrated and gained broader acceptance at the

end of the previous century, their ramifications were felt both popularly
and academically. Outside of the academy, debates raged over “political
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correctness,” representing a popular engagement with issues concerning
the referentiality and power of language as well as the politics of

representation, subjectivity, and diversity. Within the university, the status
of previously stable categories of knowledge such as culture and science
shifted. The humanities’ traditional role as a transmitter of supposed

universal human values came into considerable doubt during the “Culture
Wars” (Atwill 12). Likewise, critiques of scientific methodology and

rationality were waged from many corners during the “Science Wars.”

These critiques of the social, political, and epistemological machinations of
a once innocent and objective science were offered by numerous scholars

from the disciplines of feminist studies, the social sciences, the rhetoric of
science, science studies, science and technology studies, and the
humanities.

Within the academic humanities specifically, postmodernism can

be seen as the motive force behind many recent shifts. As the modernist,

normative subject dissolved, the formerly cohesive and complete Western
literary canon was revealed to be a surprisingly racist, classist, sexist,

homophobic, and ultimately hegemonic construction. Literary studies

responded to this revelation by diversifying its canon and its methods. The
burgeoning field of cultural studies abandoned the notion of a text

altogether—and subsequently dodged the controversy surrounding

canonicity (see Giroux et al.)—by taking all of culture as a rich “text” for
critical evaluation. Elsewhere in the humanities, composition studies

rejected the formalist approaches of current-traditional rhetorics, which as

Sharon Crowley maintains are complicit in a modern humanist program of
exclusion (Composition 94–7). Composition studies also moved to abandon
concepts derivative of the modernist subject, such as “voice” and

“expression,” and has come instead to embrace social and rhetorical

concepts such as process, ethos, audience, and collaboration. And consistent
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with postmodernism’s suspicion of the transparency and stability of

language, linguists have begun to turn away from reductive notions of

language such as structuralism and to replace them with more nuanced

accounts of language use in context such as discourse analysis, pragmatics,
and sociolinguistics.

Even technical communication—a discipline born to meet the

technological and bureaucratic needs emerging during the height of

modernism at the middle of the twentieth century (see Connors, “Rise”)—
has changed in the face of postmodernism. Much like the field of

composition, technical communication has evolved away from formalist

approaches in its scholarship, education, and practice. It has distanced itself
from what Carolyn Miller calls in her influential 1979 article “A

Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing” the windowpane theory of
language: “the notion that language provides a view out onto the real
world, a view which may be clear or obfuscated” (611–12). Such an
outlook holds that language can accurately and unproblematically

re-present—equally, to all audiences—an objective, real, stable, and

knowable external reality. Against this view of communication, as Paul
Dombrowski notes, the postmodern moment has spurred a broad

awakening to the function of rhetoric in technical communication, even
“though it was ‘always already’ there (always operative but only recently
recognized and validated)” (“Post-modernism” 179). Much recent

scholarship in technical communication joins Miller in her dismissal of the
windowpane theory, embracing instead approaches rooted in rhetoric.1

To review the central debates regarding the role of rhetoric in technical communication,
see the works of John Haage, Robert R. Johnson (“Complicating”; “Johnson Responds”),
Melinda Kreth, Miller (“Comments”), Patrick M. Moore (“Instrumental”; “Myths”;
“Response”; “Rhetorical”), and Janice (Ginny) Redish.
1

20

Particularly as new scholarship emerges urging us to shift our

attention toward postpostmodernism, a “new” or “leftist” ontology, or

whatever lies beyond postmodernism (for example, Strathausen)—and
even as some scholars recant their earlier postmodern and relativistic

theoretical proclamations (Eagleton, After; Gross)—it is easy to forget just
how disruptive, historically significant, and ultimately successful

postmodernism has been. As James Berlin notes, “Far from being the selfindulgent musings of careerist academics,” the theoretical discussions of

postmodernism have responded “to alterations in our basic understanding

of self, society, and the nature of human value fostered by today’s economic
and cultural conditions” (60). As I discuss in the next section,

postmodernism has also spurred a large-scale reconsideration of the

historic sophists, and it has enabled the application of sophistic theory
toward a wide range of contemporary issues.

Sophism’s Kairotic, Contemporary Revival

The context of postmodernism has presented a kairotic moment

for the reexamination and revival of sophism. Numerous contemporary
scholars in composition, rhetoric, communication studies, technical
communication, and the humanities have emerged to resurrect the

reputation of the sophists against the slanders of Western metaphysics—

scholars such as Michelle Ballif, Scott Consigny, Sharon Crowley, Richard
L. Enos, Stanley Fish, Susan C. Jarratt, Michael C. Leff, Kenneth J.

Lindblom, Steven Mailloux, Bruce McComiskey, John Poulakos, Takis

Poulakos, George L. Pullman, Gerald J. Savage, J. Blake Scott, and Victor
J. Vitanza, among others. Counter to the characterization of sophists as

mere flatterers and chicaners, these scholars craft revived narratives of the

sophists that serve to place them productively within a larger postmodern
critique.
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In the accounts of these scholars, the sophists’ presumed defects

under the hegemonic intellectual shadow of Plato and Aristotle become
instead virtues: the sophists were generalists, skeptics, and pragmatists;
they were socially engaged in their teaching and practice; they were

inherently disruptive and subversive; they were anti-aristocratic, antiindividualistic, and democratic; and they were relativistic in their
epistemology. As Sharon Crowley notes,

Despite its great age, ancient rhetorical theory has much to
offer postmodernity. Postmodern thought requires attention
to location and awareness of contingency. Similar
theoretical habits can be found in what we know of (or can
read into) the work of ancient rhetorical theorists as well,
particularly that generated by the Older Sophists. (Crowley,
Toward 45)

At the end of modernism, then, the sophists have come to embody a very
potent and timely corrective to the excesses of foundationalism.

I won’t attempt a complete rehearsal of the extensive body of

scholarship re-examining the sophists. (Excellent bibliographies appear in
Bruce McComiskey’s 2002 volume Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric
and Steven Mailloux’s 1995 volume Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism.)
Rather, I focus here on the more specific genre of neosophistic

appropriation. First, I present a brief examination of the pivotal debates
that served to justify the methods and aims of this genre. Next, I

characterize this genre by presenting an overview a number of works

within this genre that I feel demonstrate the particular applicability of the
sophists to contemporary history. I then conclude by describing how this

study seeks to contribute to the genre of neosophistic appropriation. First,
however, I would like to settle a terminological issue. The contemporary
movement to resurrect the sophists (and the various strains within this
movement) are called by a number of different names: “neosophism”
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(Schiappa), the “Third Sophistic” ( Jarratt; Vitanza), “a new sophistry”
(Neel 178), “sophistic rhetoric” (Poulakos, Sophistical), “the revival of

sophistry” and the “new sophistic rhetoric” (McComiskey, Gorgias). As I
use the term “neosophism” or “neosophistic rhetoric,” I refer to the
contemporary, revisionist historical movement most broadly.
Objectivist and Rhapsodic Historiography

The most pivotal debates in neosophism concern not so much who

the sophists were in the past, but rather how we come to know them in the
present. Historical study of the sophists is faced with an immediate and

formidable methodological challenge: only scant fragments of their work

survive (R. Sprague). Most of the evidence that we have about the sophists
is written by their vehement adversary, Plato (Guthrie 9), and is

“profoundly hostile” (Kerferd 1) in its treatment of them. Further

complicating matters, the precise meaning of the term “the sophists” is

itself unsettled, as it “does not refer to a group of closely allied thinkers,
nor does sophism refer to a distinct school of thought” (Pullman 52; see

also McComiskey, Gorgias 7). In light of our historical distance from these
ancient rhetoricians—and in light of the paucity and partiality of our

extant records—it remains difficult to fashion any historical account of the
sophists, let alone a redemptive one (Consigny, Gorgias 4–10). As Keith
Crome analogizes:

It is perhaps tempting to imagine that the task of [restoring
the sophists] would be akin to the labour of the picture
restorer: the delicate removal of the additions of later
hands—the various veils imposed by more censorious
eras—or the stripping away of accretions of dirt and
discouloured varnish, in order to lay bare the original
painting in the naked glory of its original colours. Nothing
could be farther from the truth. With the sophists, to strip
away the additions and accretions would simply leave
nothing. (15)
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As a result, neosophistic scholars face what Scott Consigny terms “a

hermeneutic aporia, or impasse, in that we appear to have no obvious means
of articulating and defending a particular account” of the sophists (Gorgias
9).

At least two contradictory historiographic approaches have

emerged in response to this impasse: the “objectivist” and “rhapsodic”
approaches.2 These approaches stand distinct within neosophistic

scholarship, and have been contested in recent debates among its scholars
(notably Edward Schiappa and John Poulakos). Most broadly, these

debates concern whether the practice of historiography has “more to do

with making than finding, with selection and narration rather than report”
( Jarratt, “Speaking” 190). The objectivist approach to the historical

sophists consists largely of the methodology of traditional historiography,
and it attempts to rely on factual evidence as the sole basis for its

interpretation. In contrast, the rhapsodic approach denies the possibility
for objectivity in historical interpretation and remains aware of the

contemporary significance and application of the history it constructs.
In terms of its methodological assumptions, the objectivist

approach maintains that it is possible to re-create the sophists’ history in
the present using data from the past, and that objective facts should

Here I adapt and appropriate the terms “objectivist” and “rhapsodic” from Consigny’s
2001 volume, Gorgias: Sophist and Artist (10–17). In spite of a general consensus
regarding the makeup of these divergent approaches to historiography, there seems to be
little agreement about what to call them. For instance, Schiappa refers to “historical
reconstruction” and “contemporary appropriation” (Protagoras 64); Sharon Crowley refers
to the “essentialist” and “constructionist” approaches (“Let Me” 8); and in an earlier work
Consigny refers to the “foundationalist” and “antifoundationalist” camps (“Schipppa’s”
253). Victor J. Vitanza refers to the “philological-historiographical methodology of
species-genus analytics (diaresis, dividing practices)” (Negation 123), compared to
“revisionary” or even “sub/versive” historiographies (“Critical”). Consigny, meanwhile,
presents his own cataloging of the various titles used for these approaches (Gorgias
216n29, 216n32).
2
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determine and limit our historical understanding of sophism. This

approach is perhaps best articulated by Edward Schiappa, who notes in his
1995 book Protagoras and Logos that “The object of sophistic studies […]
should be a thorough and comprehensive recovery of each Sophist’s

thinking as far as the available evidence permits. […] What is needed are
more data and an effort to understand sophistic thinking in its own

context as best one is able” (81). As Consigny notes, the ultimate goal of

this approach “is to articulate an objectively valid or ‘correct’ account” that
is untouched by “our own biased assumptions or conceptual schemes”
(Gorgias 10). An objectivist approach requires an examination of the
sophist’s original words (ipsissima verba) while ignoring subsequent

interpretations and commentary (11). Because its goal is to reconstruct the
past on its own terms, such an approach “requires some fidelity to the

methods and practices of classical philology” (Schiappa, Protagoras 66).

The cardinal sin of the objectivist approach is anachronism, or the

imposition of present-day frameworks onto historical data. For instance, as
Schiappa contends, placing Gorgias into “anachronistic categories, like

‘anti-essentialist’” is anathema to good historical scholarship (207), so too

is the notion that “current theoretical pieties” (68) such as postmodernism
should shape the practice of historiography. An objectivist historiography
should instead aim to be “free from bonds of the present” (69) and to be
innocent of larger theoretical frameworks or historiographic motives.

Schiappa denies the redemptive goal of many neosophistic scholars. To
him, the object of historical scholarship “should not be to redeem or

condemn the Sophists, any more than the study of any ancient Greek

philosopher should be to redeem or condemn a given class of thinkers”
(81).

Contrasting the objectivist approach is the rhapsodic approach.

Such an approach is perhaps best articulated by Susan C. Jarratt, who in
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her 1987 article “Toward a Sophistic Historiography” advances the notion
of a self-consciously sophistic methodology for the study of history.
Speaking of the sophists, Jarratt notes that

They created a discursive practice preceding the hardening
of generic categories like “history” but always pervaded by
an awareness of the historical. Thus both a general sophistic
attitude toward history and specific examples of sophistic
historical representation will provide the elements of a
revised historiography for rhetoric. (11)

Such a historiography, to Jarratt, entails “a redefinition and consequent

expansion of the materials and subject matters of rhetorical history,” the
eschewal of our received notions of “progressive continuity,” and “the

employment of two pre-logical language technai, antithesis and parataxis,
[to create a] narrative distinguished by multiple or open causality, the

indeterminacies of which are then resolved through the self-conscious use
of probable arguments” (11).

This sophistic approach to historical scholarship resists the

totalizing and reductive expectation to make history “a complete, replete,

full, and logically consistent narrative record” (16). It recognizes and takes
for granted that “The past is not comprehensible to the present except

through intelligible frameworks; it is simply impossible to reconstruct the
past as it actually was” (McComiskey, Gorgias 8). Such an approach builds

historical understanding of sophistic rhetoric not just for its own sake, but
with a eye toward its own present-day relevance (Hawhee 142;

McComiskey, Gorgias 55). Counter to the objectivist proscription against
anachronistic interpretation, Susan Jarratt makes clear her “wish to

discover who the ‘sophists’ are for us now” (“First Sophists” 70); similarly,
John Poulakos asserts that “classical rhetoric is not only of the past and

about the past. It is also about the present and most importantly about the
future” (“Testing” 176).
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Debates among proponents of the objectivist and rhapsodic

approaches took place primarily through the late 1980s and 1990s within
neosophistic scholarship.3 In terms of the epistemic viewpoints under
contention—that is, the foundationalist and antifoundationalist
epistemologies (Consigny, “Edward” 253) represented by each

historiographic approach—the debates can themselves be seen as a
rehearsal of the ages-old dispute between sophism and philosophy.

Although no apparent victors can be said to have emerged from these
debates, it is clear that proponents of the rhapsodic approach have

succeeded in advancing the notion—counter to received foundationalist

epistemologies—that it is possible for historical scholarship to be kairotic

and engaged rather than timeless and disinterested. In fact, an entire genre
of scholarship has emerged in recent years employing rhapsodic

historiography toward contemporary intellectual and political ends,

establishing the rhapsodic approach as a legitimate scholarly strategy for
addressing present-day issues.

The Genre of Neosophistic Appropriation

As McComiskey observes, “During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,

sophistic rhetoric traveled: it was transported from the fifth century BCE

into twentieth century CE rhetorical theory and composition studies, and
this process of transportation has enabled new ‘intellectual activities’”
(Gorgias 57). McComiskey refers to this process of transportation as

“neosophistic appropriation”: the process of adapting and remolding the

ancient sophists to suit the particular exigencies of the present (55, 56). In
See, for instance, the works of Consigny, John Poulakos (“Interpreting”; “Rhetoric”;
Sophistical; “Terms”; “Testing”; “Toward”), McComiskey, Schiappa (“Did”; “History”;
“Neo-Sophistic”; Protagoras; “Some”; “Sophistic”), Richard Marback, Murphy et al., and
Vitanza (“Critical”; Negation; Writing).
3
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this section I outline a handful of scholarly works within the genre of

neosophistic appropriation, works that are engaged in a diverse range of

contemporary intellectual and political endeavors: developing a feminist
composition pedagogy ( Jarratt), building connections to pragmatist

philosophy and reforming English Studies (Mailloux), creating new
conceptions of ethical practice for the teaching of technical

communication ( J. Blake Scott), and developing a deconstructive feminist
“Third Sophistic” to inform rhetorical education (Ballif ). Although there
is great breadth in their application, these works are united in that they

each seek to “‘mine’ sophistic doctrines and historical interpretations of
these doctrines for theories and methods that contribute solutions to

problems in contemporary rhetoric” (McComiskey, Gorgias 55). While the

following works are hardly a complete catalog of scholarship in the genre, I
believe that they are emblematic of the particular methods, motivations,
and diverse applications of neosophistic appropriation.

In her 1991 volume Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric

Refigured, Jarratt appropriates the sophists for a feminist project of

revising composition pedagogy. Jarratt notes that “The congruence of

logo- and phallocentrism places both sophistic rhetoric and woman at the
negative pole against philosophy and man” (65), and she describes the
significant theoretical correspondence between the feminist and

neosophistic projects. She notes that the sophists speak to a number of

contemporary issues in the teaching of composition, and that “analyzing
the relationships among their social theory, their pedagogy, and the

functioning of democracy in their time can lead to a more pointedly

political evaluation of the teaching of writing in our own” (xxiv). Jarratt
offers sophistic rhetoric as a way to counter the “powerful ideology of
individualism [that] works against a sense of community both in the

classroom and outside” (88). Taking her cue from the ancient sophists,
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Jarratt then articulates a feminist/sophistic composition pedagogy as social,
political, and democratic, and “distinguished from the detachment of

philosophy in its engagement in social action” (94). Such a pedagogy—
contra feminist pedagogies that “emphasize the nurturing role of the

writing teacher” (115)—embraces conflict as a vital and distinctly feminist
defining feature (see also Jarratt, “Feminism”; Jarratt, “Reflections”):
The discursive method driving both feminist and sophistic
ways of negotiating change through discourse is argument,
wherein rhetorical positions stand temporarily as grounds
for action in the absence of universally verifiable truth.
When we recognizing [sic] the need to confront the
different truths our students bring to our classes—not only
through self-discovery but in the heat of argument—
feminism and rhetoric become allies in contention with the
forces of oppression troubling us all. (116)

Meanwhile, in his 1995 edited collection Rhetoric, Sophistry,

Pragmatism, Steven Mailloux brings together a number of scholars to

explore the confluence of sophistic rhetoric and neopragmatism. Citing

pragmatist thinkers from both ends of the 20th century—thinkers such as
C.S. Pierce, William James, John Dewey, James H. Tufts, F.C.S. Schiller,
Richard Rorty, and Stanley Fish—Mailloux maintains that

“neopragmatism can be viewed as a postmodernist form [or reception] of
sophistic rhetoric” (2; see also Mailloux “Reception” 22). Defining

pragmatism in 1909, William James writes that “All the pragmatic method
implies is that truths should have practical consequences […] the word has
[also] been used more broadly still, to cover the notion that the truth of
any statement consists in the consequences” (52). Pragmatist epistemic

viewpoints such as these, as Mailloux and his contributors maintain, are
theoretically consistent with the doctrines of the ancient sophists. As

Mailloux suggests, the project of drawing connections between the two can
speak to the politics of the contemporary, postmodern context:
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Collective action to change society, affirm cultural values, or
reform higher education requires some agreement and a
measure of solidarity. It requires a lot of give-and-take in
rhetorical negotiation. It cannot be guaranteed by either
rhetoric or philosophy, by rhetorical pragmatism or
foundationalist theory. However, some of us working in the
pragmatist tradition think that at this historical moment a
strategic emphasis on the first term in each of these pairs
might enhance the effectiveness of progressive political
activity in and outside our academic institutions. (21;
Mailloux “Reception” 41)

In his 1998 volume Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American
Cultural Politics, Mailloux further articulates how sophistic and pragmatist
thought can inform our understanding contemporary problems as he

describes responses to the “Culture Wars” and the need for curricular
reform in English Studies.

In his 1995 article “Sophistic Ethics in the Technical Writing

Classroom: Teaching Nomos, Deliberation, and Action,” J. Blake Scott
draws on the ancient sophists to articulate a technical communication
pedagogy that is specifically concerned with ethics. He identifies the
relativist epistemic stance of the ancient sophists not as “a blatant

disregard of ethics, but [as] a recognition of the epistemological power of

language as a sign system” (191). He suggests that the sophists’ reliance on
nomos, or social convention, as the basis for ethical practice can serve as a

valid model for contemporary technical communication. As he contends,
to treat ethics as sophistic

can empower contemporary technical writing students in at
least the three following ways: 1) it enables students to
recognize versions of truth and goodness, including their
own, as culturally determined rather than physis [i.e.,
determined by nature]; 2) sophistic ethics requires students
to deliberate about the power and consequences of their
rhetoric and that of others; 3) through deliberation and
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responsible action, sophistic ethics invites students to
participate in the development of nomoi or ethical codes.
(194)

Scott notes that the alternatives to such a sophistic conception of ethical
practice “—all of which foreclose ethical debate—are to ignore ethics

altogether, to compress all ethics into an utilitarian ethic of expediency, or
to present an ethical system based on physis” (195). Scott concludes by

calling for technical communication to incorporate “ethical enculturation”
into its pedagogy by setting up internships, communicating with

businesses, having students work collaboratively, teaching case studies,

using class time to interrogate examples of problematic technical writing,
and modeling ethical practice as teachers (196–7).

Finally, in her 2001 volume Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman

with the Rhetorical Figure, Michelle Ballif draws from the sophists (and

Vitanza’s earlier work with the sophists) to develop a fully deconstructive
“Third Sophistic” rhetoric. Ballif contends that the work of other

neosophistic scholars has only “sought to codify sophistry—to make it

something—to give it being and presence” in a metaphysical sense, and to
“make sophistry into a true technē not a spurious art” (64). For instance,

counter to Mailloux, Ballif denies the connections between neopragmatism
and sophism, claiming that neopragmatism is not sufficiently

deconstructive, nor is it “sophistic enough” (183); she also sees Jarratt’s

redemptive, feminist attempt at neosophistic appropriation as only serving
to reinforce the modernist binaries that first enable repression. Instead,
Ballif offers “Third Sophistic postmodern posthuman transrhetoric(s)”

(178) as a more radical alternative. This conception of rhetoric seeks to

“stretch the borders of language, render the code liquid, in order to free us,
sophistically, from philosophy’s demands for faithful reference and

undistorted communication and communities” (184). Such a model is

enacted in part through Donna Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg and
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through application of the ancient concepts of metis (cunning) and kairos
(timeliness). Although deeply theoretical in character, Ballif’s work

remains conscious of its practical application as it seeks to “question the

sophists and Plato’s reading of them through the lens of today—of today’s
argument about subjectivity, agency, and choice in critical pedagogies and
composition studies” (33).

While these works are widely divergent in their applications and

interpretations, they join in the common cause of translating the history of
the ancient sophists into usable theories and guidelines for the present.
They also demonstrate that, counter to the methodology of objectivist

historiography, history can serve in a capacity beyond the mere fashioning

of “objective facts” about the past. With the present study, I seek to join in
the rhapsodic and appropriative spirit of these works by employing the
strategy of neosophistic appropriation toward current questions and

conversations within the discipline of technical communication. In the
chapters that follow, I use neosophistic appropriation to connect the

ancient sophists to contemporary feminist critiques of science, to articulate
a feminist-sophistic methodology for the present research into technical
communication certificate programs, and to engage in some rhetorical
revisioning of the empirical research genre. In addition to using

neosophistic appropriation to inform the methodology and method of this
study, I also rely on it as a theoretical lens for interpreting its results at the
conclusion of this work.

I make no pretense in this study to contributing to the important

genre of objectivist historiography. In this study, I rely largely on secondary
resources and contemporary commentary on the sophists, mostly works
employing rhapsodic historiography or themselves contributing to the
genre of neosophistic appropriation. As I discuss in chapter 3, I also

attempt to remain self-consciously aware of the audiences, contexts, and
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purposes of this research; the scholarly conversations that this research

addresses; and the practical ends this research will support. And while I

frequently resist the foundationalist impulse toward historical particularity
and facticity in this work, I believe that this permits me, in turn, to

integrate and synthesize ideas in ways that can more productively speak to
contemporary issues and conversations. In adopting these overall

approaches, I intend to join a recent tradition in neosophistic scholarship
of “transporting” the ancient sophists into the present. As McComiskey
notes of the ancient sophists,

They are here with us, looking over our shoulders as we
write. The sophists have had profound influences on some
of the most important developments in rhetorical theory
and composition studies, and to neglect their journey into
the twentieth century and beyond would be first, to neglect
a critical aspect of rhetoric’s history and second, to neglect
one of the richest historical resources. (Gorgias 141n2)

In the following chapter, I begin to describe how such a rich historical
resource will, in part, inform the methodology of the present research
project.
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Chapter 2:
Toward a Feminist-Sophistic Methodology
As I noted in the introduction, this study emerges from, and is

intended to speak to, conversations within the academic field of technical
communication. Among my most immediate goals is to develop data

useful to certificate program administrators and to those contemplating
the establishment of new certificate programs. In particular, I seek to
develop basic data concerning the curricular and faculty makeup of

existing certificate programs. But as I first considered the traditional,

quantitative/empirical methodologies required to develop these data, I

began to feel uneasy. Many aspects of these methodologies stand opposed
to emerging postmodern and neosophistic intellectual positions.

For instance, in their implicit assertion of the ideologies of

universal truth, objectivity, and an autonomous subject, stock phrases of
the empirical research report genre such as “the data show” and “it was

observed” reflect a modernist, Platonic-Aristotelian, and foundationalist

orientation. I was particularly concerned that I would be compelled by the
dictates of a traditional methodology to remain absent as an agent—

rhetorically, grammatically, and ethically—in this research. In seeming
contradiction, I found myself wanting a methodology diverging from

foundationalism, while simultaneously supporting broad, persuasive claims
about technical communication programs nationwide. In this chapter, I
describe my efforts to work out such a methodology. In particular, I

describe how I find within both neosophism and feminist critiques of

science the basis for new approaches toward the production of knowledge
that avoid the totalizing impulses of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition
while still allowing for the positive production of usable knowledge.
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In his 1995 article, “Post-Modernism as the Resurgence of

Humanism in Technical Communication Studies,” Paul M. Dombrowski
characterizes at least four contemporary intellectual projects emerging
during the postmodern context: the rhetoric of science, social

constructionism, feminist critiques of science, and ethical critiques of
science. As he notes, scholars engaged with these projects

challenge specifically the notion that “facts” are supposedly
absolute and pre-existent, on the grounds that this decontextualizes facts and tacitly denies the very real social
contingencies that create facts. From this perspective, facts
become social artifacts, products for consumption, and
reinforcers of the value system from which they spring.
(166).

As he contends, these four, seemingly disparate projects are united by their
humanism, a concept that he defines as “the maximization of human

potential, the affirmation of cultural criticism, and the rejection of rigid

absolutism” (176). Dombrowski then suggests that postmodernism and
humanism are themselves, in turn, linked under sophism (177). In the

same spirit as this broadly integrative and important work, in this study I

seek to place emphasis on the commonality of specific intellectual projects

and to work at their shared borders to address contemporary conversations
in technical communication.

Although I began by wanting a research methodology more

consistent with emerging neosophistic and postmodern theories, I believe
that much of the critical and intellectual work needed to develop such a
methodology has already been performed under the aegis of feminist

theory. Specifically, I believe that critiques of science found in feminist
standpoint theory directly address many of the epistemological and
methodological issues that I initially sought to address by way of

neosophism. Further, these critiques contend directly with the traditions of
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Western science in ways that neosophism immediately does not. In order

to join forces with this feminist theoretical work already underway, in this
chapter I draw from—and draw the connections between—both feminist

critiques of science and neosophistic perspectives to begin to craft a viable
methodology for the present study. This synthetic methodology is, I
contend, most aptly described as “feminist-sophistic.”

Of course, others have already worked to unite these larger

perspectives: Michelle Ballif relies on neosophistic theory in her

deconstruction of the very ontic categories of male and female, and Susan
C. Jarratt is perhaps the single commentator most defined by her work at
the nexus of neosophism and feminist theory. However, I maintain that
the combined potential of neosophism and certain feminist critiques of

science remains largely unexplored. As I will show in this chapter, these

projects already share considerable ethical, epistemological, and political
common ground. In addition, the unique methodological insights of

feminist critiques of science come together with the unique rhetorical
insights of neosophism to suggest a powerful, antifoundationalist

methodology. Not only do these projects offer productive critiques of

traditional research methodologies, but, as I maintain, they ultimately
suggest new alternatives for more ethical and situated inquiry.

My Standpoint

First, to shed some light on the origins of my methodology, I begin

by very briefly describing my own subject position in terms of both my

disciplinary/material allegiances and epistemic stance. Beginning with the
personal is, I admit, anathema to a traditional understanding of

methodology in which the researcher is held to be wholly independent

from the act of research and the (purportedly transcendent) knowledge

that research produces. However, even given the relatively straightforward
design of the present empirical study, I believe that my subject position
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and my so-called “personal” stances are determining influences on the

knowledge claims this study supports. It is for these reasons that I feel
compelled to foreground my standpoint here.

By way of intellectual autobiography, I developed as a scholar at

Midwestern, United States universities within both scientific and

humanistic contexts. I hold a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and

computer science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I
am currently vested in the humanities: I hold a master of arts degree in
English Studies (specializing in technical writing); as declared on the

cover page, this work is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a PhD in Rhetoric and Technical Communication from the

Department of Humanities at Michigan Technological University; and I
began a tenure line job in the department of Writing and Rhetoric at

Oakland University in fall 2008. My material and disciplinary allegiances
are primarily to the fields of technical communication, rhetoric (in the
humanities tradition), and composition.

I would describe myself as a neosophist; a social constructionist; a

postmodernist; and a third wave, anti-essentialist feminist. I hold that

knowledge is, by definition, intersubjective, and it is socially constructed. I
believe that all claims to knowledge are rhetorical, and that rhetoric is

fundamentally epistemic. It should (but frustratingly, doesn’t) go without
saying, though: I am not a nihilist. I believe that those who see relativism
and social constructionism precluding the adjudication of competing

claims fundamentally misunderstand both concepts. Relativism does not
mean “anything goes,” and social construction does not mean “arbitrary
fabrication.” I believe that rhetoric, defined simply as persuasion, is not
only a sufficient basis for the peaceful adjudication of competing

knowledge or value claims, it is the only such basis we have ever known.
As a postmodernist, I eschew notions of the autonomous individual. I
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likewise deny the modernist myth of objectivity, which holds that

individuals can transparently describe a prior and independent reality.

Finally, as a third wave, anti-essentialist feminist, I believe that sex, gender,
and sexuality are not inviolable consequences of biological nature, but are
social constructs (which—I’m compelled to repeat the caveat—does not
imply that they are arbitrary constructs).

As should be apparent in the sections that follow, the above are

some of the key material, ideological, and political factors that inform the
feminist-sophistic methodology I seek to develop. Further, these are the
factors that I inescapably bring bear on my research—whether

acknowledged or not. By foregrounding these factors here, my intent is not
to establish this study as subjective, unreliable, or somehow tainted by the
personal. Rather, I wish to establish it as intersubjective, situated, and
emanating from an identifiable subject position. Remaining ethically

situated and self-consciously rhetorical in these ways are, as I show, key
components of a feminist-sophistic methodology.

The Methodological Complementarity of Feminism and
Neosophism
On the face of it, there would appear to be fundamental

discrepancies between feminism and neosophism most broadly. As several
commentators note, ascribing to the ancient sophists any particular

political agenda—let alone a feminist or postmodern program—is a

tenuous undertaking (McComiskey, Gorgias 75; Consigny, Gorgias 9). The
patriarchal and oligarchic culture of ancient Greece can hardly be called

“feminist” (Wick 27, Biesecker 99) or even “democratic” (McComiskey,
Gorgias 140n2) by contemporary standards (see also Crockett 73–5).

History suggests that “material reality for women in Greek antiquity was
oppressive” ( Jarratt, Rereading 63) and that education in this historical
context “was an elitist tradition in which, for the most part, only male
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children of noble families were permitted to participate” (Crowley, “Plea”
319). In her book Speaking for the Polis, Takis Poulakos aptly summarizes
why the contemporary relevance of the ancient Greeks at first appears
dubious:

Classical Athens was a slave society, a place where Athenian
women and non-Athenian-born males were noncitizens
and where a few landowners and aristocrats maintained a
stranglehold on the economy while the majority of people
worked fields in the country, lived as manual laborers, or
depended on the public treasury for sustenance. It was a
society driven by war, expansion, conquest, and people who
understood as an assertion of their own freedom the
capacity to extend their borders outward and dominate
others by turning them into slaves or imposing on them
tributes. From the point of view of our own social values
and present commitments to equality, there seems to be no
connection at all, no reason whatsoever to study Classical
Athens or to expect any similarities between society then
and now. (2)

Drawing inspiration from the ancient Greeks—in whose “historical texts

are the power relations of their day, complete with all of their cruelties and
injustices” (Vitanza, Writing 118)—would initially seem antithetical not
only to feminism, but to all progressive, liberatory political projects.

It’s important to keep in mind, however, that the historical and

theoretical precedents of the sophists do not offer a literal or totalizing
model for contemporary practice—even supposing our record of them

were complete enough to attempt to fashion one. Although I aim to show
that the theoretical connections between neosophism and feminist

critiques of science are multiple, the connections between the ancients

themselves and contemporary feminist projects remain appropriative at

best. Alluding to this, Jarratt notes that “though the sophists may not be

‘feminists,’ current feminists are becoming sophists in the best sense of the
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word by describing rhetorical solutions to the crucial problems of defining
a theory with the most power for changing women’s lives” (Rereading 79).
As I draw connections between the two perspectives in the following

sections, then, I do so not to (further) fetishize a hegemonic rhetorical
history, but to critically appropriate from it in order to develop usable
theories for the present.

Some commentators maintain that by directly taking on the

Platonic-Aristotelian intellectual tradition, the very premise of

neosophism represents a feminist political project. As Jarratt notes in
Rereading the Sophists,

Indeed, Plato and Aristotle defined philosophy through the
exclusion of rhetoric as the degraded term. For Plato, the
sophists signified opinion as opposed to Truth, the
materiality of the body (e.g., in association with cooking
and cosmetics) vs. soul, practical knowledge vs. science, the
temporal vs. the eternal, writing (explicitly as an artificial
aid to memory) vs. speech (as the vehicle of intuited
knowledge). This cluster of terms coincided on many
counts with the cultural stereotype of the “feminine”
operative in the West for centuries. (65)

Jarratt further notes the gendered implications of Plato’s comparisons:

“Both rhetoric and women are trivialized by identification with sensuality,
costume, and color—all of which are supposed to be manipulated in

attempts to persuade through deception” (65).4 In their shared opposition

For a contrasting perspective, see C. Jan Swearingen’s “Plato’s Feminine: Appropriation,
Impersonation, and Metaphorical Polemic.” While admitting that “Plato is a prime
progenitor of masculine logo- and phallo-centrism” (109), Swearingen downplays Plato’s
apparent misogyny. Countering Jarratt’s assertion that Plato’s metaphors for rhetorical
practice are “feminine” and trivializing, she urges us to read the metaphors and the
women characters in his dialogues as more positive acts of appropriation. She notes that
our tendency as modern readers to read Plato as “male” is a result of his intellectual
4
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to many of the Platonic ideals of the Western intellectual tradition, then,
we can see an immediate cause common to both neosophism and
feminism broadly.

But more particular aspects of neosophism overlap with feminist

critiques of science as well. Voices in each project foreground the role of

the social in epistemology (including in their embrace, to varying degrees,
of relativism; in their critiques of modernist, scientific objectivity; and in

their recognition of the social construction of knowledge). Voices in each

project eschew an epistemology defined by essences, as evidenced by their

common critical interrogation of the concepts nature and culture (or, physis
and nomos). And finally, while both projects offer compelling critiques of
our received epistemologies, they also demonstrate a commitment to

developing new, more responsible forms of developing knowledge. That is,
even while both projects can be considered devastating in their assessment
of traditional epistemologies, unlike Derridian deconstruction and similar
“acid tools of postmodern theory” (Haraway, Simians 157) both present
optimism toward the possibility of meaning-making and suggest new,

positive epistemologies to displace those that they critique. I discuss each
of these specific areas of congruence in further detail in the following
sections.

A Shared Recognition of the Social Situation of Knowledge
Production

In the previous chapter, I explored the emergence of neosophism at

the latter half of the twentieth century. Susan Hekman notes that, during
this time, “a paradigm shift has been under way in epistemology, a

movement from an absolutist, subject-centered conception of truth to a
legacy: a product of the “increasingly masculinist philosophical tradition that he
inaugurated” (115).
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conception of truth as situated, perspectival, and discursive” (“Truth” 233).
This paradigm shift entails a recognition that our traditional activities of

knowledge production and research fall short of their purported abilities to
transcend social context. As Sandra Harding notes in her introduction to
The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader,

The idea that the very best research, no less than the worst,
does and should “speak” from particular, historically
specific, social locations has been out of the question for
standard research norms. […] the whole point of scientific
knowledge in the Modern West, in contrast to “folk
knowledge,” is supposed to be that its adequacy should
transcend the particular historical projects that produce it
or, at any given moment, happen to find itself useful. (4)

Counter to the decidedly Platonic notion of truth as eternal and prior

which informs the Western model of knowledge Harding characterizes
here—and consistent with the emerging paradigm that Hekman

identifies—both neosophism and feminist critiques of science hold that
knowledge claims are born of and bound to particular social contexts.

Many feminist critiques of science begin with the material and

social aspects of knowledge production, most particularly those aspects
that serve to subjugate and marginalize women. Doing more than just

pointing out simple instances of “bias” or “bad science” (Haraway, Simians
186; Harding, “Introduction” 4; Harding, Science 138; Alcoff and Potter
30), however, such critiques go on to deeply problematize our received

epistemologies of scientific objectivity by establishing their foundation in
the material and social. As Lorraine Code notes, these feminist critiques
have demonstrated that the ideals of the autonomous
reasoner—the dislocated, disinterested observer—and the
epistemologies they inform are the artifacts of a small,
privileged group of educated, usually prosperous, white men
[…]. Their circumstances enable them to believe that they
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are materially and even affectively autonomous and to
imagine that they are nowhere or everywhere, even as they
occupy an unmarked position of privilege. (21)

Feminist standpoint theory (which grew from the work of Patricia Hill
Collins, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Nancy C.M. Hartsock, and
Dorothy E. Smith, among others) further refines this broad epistemic
critique by maintaining that the practices of scientific research and

knowledge production are tied—materially, socially, and politically—to the
subjectivity of researchers working from specific standpoints.

Early proponents of standpoint theory claimed an epistemological

superiority for research performed from standpoints of the marginalized
(Hekman, “Truth” 227). For instance, Allison M. Jaggar, in her 1983

article “Feminist Politics and Epistemology: The Standpoint of Women,”
holds that “the special social or class position of women gives them a

special epistemological standpoint which makes possible a view of the

world that is more reliable and less distorted than that available either to
capitalist or to working-class men” (56). Jaggar continues:

The standpoint of the oppressed is not just different from
that of the ruling class; it is also epistemologically
advantageous. It provides the basis for a view of reality that
is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more
comprehensive. It is more impartial because it comes closer
to representing the interests of society as a whole […]. (57)

As Susan Hekman maintains in her 1997 article “Truth and Method:

Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited,” however, standpoint theory has

evolved away from its initial impulse toward universal truth, impartiality,
and privileged perspectives as found in Jaggar’s position. She contends
that, “The new paradigm of knowledge of which feminist standpoint

theory is a part involved rejecting the definition of knowledge and truth as
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either universal or relative in favor of a conception of all knowledge as
situated and discursive” (234).

Although feminist standpoint theory is multiple in its stances—

and is perhaps more akin to a nuanced conversation than it is to simple
sloganeering (Mann and Kelly 392)—it presents a consistent epistemic
critique foregrounding the role of the social in knowledge production.

Likewise, neosophistic theorists recognize within the ancient sophists a
vital epistemology that, counter to our received Platonic-Aristotelian

epistemologies, is discursive and socially situated. For these scholars, the
sophists present an ancient historical precedent for, and a metaphorical
embodiment of, epistemic critiques emerging during the postmodern
moment.

The ancient sophists present some fairly direct evidence—

inasmuch as our historical record of them of them can be considered

“direct”—that they viewed knowledge construction as a social process.
Several scholars (Mailloux, Rhetoric; Jarratt, Rereading; McComiskey,

Gorgias; Pullman) point to Protagoras’ famous fifth century dictum, “Man
is the measure of all things” (antrhôpos metron) as evidence of a relativistic
stance for Protagoras and the ancient sophists. Although there is

considerable debate over the status of the word “man” as a collective noun
or not (Guthrie 188; Mailloux, Rhetoric 10), it is clear from this dictum
that Protagoras believed that humankind “determined the contents of
reality for itself” (Pullman 54). Likewise, drawing from Mario

Untersteiner, Susan Jarratt interprets Protagoras’ saying “Concerning the

gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what
form they might have, for there is much to prevent one’s knowing” (R.

Sprague 20) as a “Careful expression of ignorance [that] directs energy
away from the search for an external knowledge source and throws the
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responsibility for determining the nature of things onto humans”
(Rereading 50).

Similarly, in his volume Gorgias: Sophist and Artist, Scott Consigny

analyzes Gorgias’ extant fragments in order to join in the “interpretive

game” of making sense of this early sophist and his doctrines. Consigny
draws from The Encomium of Helen to argue that Gorgias—reflecting a

trait we can see in contemporary feminist critiques—was skeptical of the
practitioners of science in his day:

Gorgias does not construe science as an empirical study
[…] wherein one attains an increasing approximation of the
“real nature of things”; and he does not construe scientific
discourse as the articulation or communication of such
truths. Instead, he suggests that scientific discourse, like the
discourse of poets, philosophers, and popular orators, is
thoroughly rhetorical, concerned with demolishing opinions
and displacing them with others. (59)

By establishing scientific knowledge-making as rhetorical in this way,
knowledge production comes to be seen occurring at the sites of the

communal and public. To Consigny, “Rather than originating from a
solitary inward experience or a journey beyond the everyday, Gorgias

indicates that the origin of his speech lies entirely within an established
and recognized agon” (83). Furthermore,

The community or audience is engaged in the process of
inquiry from the very inception of the agon, for it is their
beliefs that demarcate the conceptual site of the inquiry. It
is within the domain of the audience’s beliefs that the
rhetors operate, and if they “stray” from this domain of
beliefs, they risk losing the contests. (84)

Ultimately then, we can see Gorgias holding truth not as emanating from
individual observers in the form of empirical, objective facts, but closer to

holding “truth as an endorsement awarded by a community to an account
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that it finds most persuasive” ( Jarratt, Rereading 60). Neosophistic scholars

find within these Gorgian epistemological stances the historical precedents
for postmodern conceptions of knowledge production as socially situated
and discursive. These stances are likewise common to many feminist
theoretical voices.

A Shared Interrogation of the Concepts Nature and Culture

In addition to drawing our attention toward the social dimension

of knowledge production, both neosophistic rhetoric and feminist critiques
of science can be seen to reject an epistemology predicated on essences.

This is evidenced by both projects’ preoccupation with “exploring physis
and nomos” (Wick 30)—that is, the respective concepts of “nature” and

“culture.”5 Of course, these two terms are of immediate concern for many

feminist projects, and represent the conceptual sites of much of feminism’s
political agon. As Susan Hekman notes in her 1990 book Gender and
Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism:

The dichotomy between nature and culture as it has been
articulated in western thought since Plato is defined by the
masculine/feminine dichotomy and characterized by the
assumption that woman has an essential nature that is
linked in some special way to the natural world. […]
Furthermore, the notion that woman does have a special
nature and that this nature does and should define her
social role, is, like the link between woman and nature,
rooted in the origins of western thought. (135–6)

According to W.K.C. Guthrie, physis “can be safely translated ‘nature,’ though when it
occurs in conjunction with nomos the word ‘reality’ will sometimes make the contrast
more immediately clear” (55). Nomos, as Jarratt defines it, “refers to provisional codes
(habits or customs) of social and political behavior, socially constructed and historically
(even geographically) specific” (Rereading 74). I will move unmarked between the
correlating English and Greek terms here.
5
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At issue is the extent to which difference is seen as premeditated by the
natural (essentialism) or the extent to which it is socially constituted

(social constructionism). Feminist considerations of this dichotomy have
led to a critical examination—and in some cases deconstruction—of the
very categories nature and culture.

For example, socialist-feminist critic Donna Haraway offers a

potent exploration and deconstruction of the nature/culture binary in her
1991 collection of essays Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, a project to which

she holds is “about the invention and reinvention of nature—perhaps the

most central arena of hope, oppression, and contestation for inhabitants of
the planet earth in our times” (xi). In this project, she demonstrates how

conceptions of “nature” (constructed against a counterpart “culture”) have

broad implications for science, technology, gender, identity, sexual politics,
and other significant loci of contest within feminist theory.

In an essay examining studies in biology and sociobiology, for

instance, Haraway explores how our supposedly disinterested scientific
study of the “natural world” serves to rationalize and reinscribe unjust

human social orders. Drawing from primate bioantrhopology, biology,

medicine, and elsewhere, she demonstrates how scientific, “sociobiological

reasoning applied to human societies easily glides into facile naturalization
of job segregation, dominance hierarchies, racial chauvinism, and the

‘necessity’ of domination in sexually based societies to control the nastier

aspects of genetic competition” (67). In her essay “‘Gender’ for a Marxist

Dictionary: The Sexual Politics of a Word,” Haraway traces the evolution
of the sex-gender distinction and its historical intertwining with the

concepts of nature and culture. And, of course, her most familiar (and

vivid) embodiment of the deconstructive impulse is her metaphor of the

Cyborg: within this figure (among other Western binarisms) “Nature and
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culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for
appropriation or incorporation by the other” (151).

The ancient sophists were similarly concerned with the concepts of

nature and culture, including the particular ways that these concepts came
to determine social orders. As W.K.C. Guthrie notes in his volume The
Sophists, the terms nomos and physis

are key-words—in the fifth and fourth centuries one might
rather say catch-words—of Greek thought. In earlier
writers they do not necessarily appear incompatible or
antithetical, but in the intellectual climate of the fifth
century, they came to be commonly regarded as opposed
and mutually exclusive: what existed ‘by nomos’ was not ‘by
physis’ and vice versa. (55)

As Guthrie describes it, in ancient Greece “Once the view had gained
currency that laws, customs and conventions were not part of the

immutable order of things, it was possible to adopt very different attitudes

toward them” (21). As the conceptual distinctions emerged between nature
and culture, many began to question things previously held only to be of

natural or divine ordinance, such as the existence of the gods, the creation
of states, divisions within the human race, the inevitability of human rule
over others, etc. (57–8).

By throwing into doubt the primacy of physis in human affairs and

by presenting the possibilities attendant to nomos, the sophists were able to
employ “narratives to radically reconstruct their own histories in terms

which opened space for difference” ( Jarratt, Rereading 74). Again, while no
figures in ancient Greece would likely be called liberatory or progressive by
today’s standards, the sophists were able to at least question the presumed
natural origins of social divisions. Referring to Gorgias’ Encomium of
Helen, Susan Jarratt notes that
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In Gorgias’s imaginative reconstruction of Helen’s
abduction, desire, will, and language throw open the
traditional causal logic of her case and, in so doing, dislodge
a mythic source for misogynism. In Protagoras’s revisionary
retelling of the Promethean creation myth, we find laid out
the process for the social construction of identity: an
explanation of how family and school teach codes which
determine the modes of expression available. (Rereading 75)

Likewise, the sophist Antiphon employed the physis-nomos distinction to

argue against notions of “high and low birth,” and to argue that there was
“no difference in nature between barbarians and Greeks” (Guthrie 24).

As practicing rhetors, the sophists knew that they only stood to

gain rhetorical agency by advancing the scope of nomos, since no amount

of persuasive discourse can successfully argue against immutable physis. By
bringing social orders previously determined by physis into the realm of

nomos, the sophists opened them up for rhetorical deliberation, and created
new possibilities for their construction. Many feminist projects likewise

recognize that conceptions of nature and culture determine their rhetorical
agency. While not all feminisms concur, certainly many of the anti-

essentialist, social constructionist viewpoints found within third wave

feminism work to bring social orders previously determined by nature into
the realm of culture. Social orders predicated on the constructs of sex and
gender are then opened for deliberation, and new possibilities are created

for their construction. These shared interrogations of the concepts nature
and culture concern more than just social and political possibilities,

though: they also reflect a antifoundationalist epistemology common to

voices in feminist theory and neosophism. By recognizing the fluidity and
constructedness of the categories nature and culture, these voices can be

seen rejecting an epistemology predicated on the notion of inviolable and
immutable essences.
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A Shared Optimism and Commitment to New Epistemic
Projects

Finally, even while critical of traditional epistemologies, voices

from feminist critiques of science and neosophism are consistent in their

optimism toward the possibility for meaning-making and—unlike certain
postmodern projects—attempt to create new frameworks for the creation
of knowledge. Neosophism, in spite of the overall epistemological

relativism it presents, can be seen as very much concerned with the

creation of (if not eternal, then at least provisional) truths. Likewise,

several feminist critiques of science work to fashion new and productive

models for research, even as they stand in critical opposition to traditional
methods. Both of these critical approaches, in turn, suggest positive
responses to the epistemic dilemmas presented by postmodernism.

As Consigny notes, the prospects of a sophistic epistemology may

at first seem to be quite dismal: If Gorgias

repudiates the foundationalist notion that there is a truth in
the world that is independent of our contingent discourses,
it would seem that he rejects the possibility of truth,
knowledge, and meaningful discourse altogether. As such,
he would seem to abandon us to a radical solipsism, in
which we are not only prevented from apprehending
anything about the world itself, but in which we are
prevented from experiencing kairotic moments that are
replete with meaning. Unable to apprehend or experience
the truth, we would appear to be condemned […]. (73)

But Consigny contends that this is not the actually the case, as Gorgias

views the agon as a viable and meaningful source of truth (73–4). Likewise,
as Jarratt notes, “Despite the radical propositions of On the Nonexistent,
often taken to lead to complete solipsism, Gorgias does not deny any

possibility for communication” (Rereading 55). And Bruce McComiskey
suggests that, “Although Gorgias is clearly an ontological skeptic, he is
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not, as is often incorrectly assumed, an epistemological skeptic” (Gorgias
35; “Toward” 8). These characterizations run counter to many prevalent

depictions of Gorgias as a “glib nihilist who advanced no positive theories”
(Enos 73).

Similarly, sophistic theory productively addresses a more recent

epistemic impasse. In her 1992 article “The Praise of Folly: The Woman

Rhetor, and Post-Modern Skepticism,” Patricia Bizzell notes that, while

the perspective of Derridian deconstruction is “a liberating one, freeing us
from oppressive traditional sexisms, racism, classisms, and other culturally
sanctioned forms of discrimination and exploitation” (14), it nonetheless
seems to tear down without building up, to undermine our
confidence in the possibility of shared mental powers and
egalitarian values that would enable people to work toward
a new and more just social order. […] Enveloped by an
otherwise anti-position-taking theoretical climate, we
nevertheless find ourselves wanting to advocate positions.
(14–15).

Bizzell’s critique is that deconstruction appears to leave little space left for
political agency; she compares the postmodern stance to Pyrrhonian

skepticism: a radical form of skepticism that doubts whether anything can
ever be known at all (9).

In his 1996 article “Toward a Neosophistic Writing Pedagogy,”

Kenneth J. Lindblom directly responds to Bizzell’s critique. As a solution
to the apparent impasse presented by postmodern deconstruction,

Lindblom suggests turning toward “the early Greek sophists,” who he

believes “offer a theoretical base to Bizzell and all of us who are interested
in professing left-oriented values in our writing classrooms” (93).

Developing “a sophistic understanding of the progress of knowledge,” he

suggests, “can enable us to avoid the trap of Pyrrhonian skepticism” (93).
51

Lindblom demonstrates specific teaching methods that he considers to be
sophistic in construction, and concludes by asserting that

The constant attention to the sociopolitical construction of
knowledge that a neosophistic pedagogy demands explicitly
and unquestionably interconnects the operations of
communities and the operations of writers, making
sociopolitical action not only a valid element but a
necessary component of composition curricula. (105)

The answer to the postmodern impasse for Lindblom, then, lies in the

historical precedent of the sophists. Again, while he speaks specifically

about their application in composition, we can see Lindblom’s turn toward
the sophists suggesting a broader, productive epistemology beyond the

classroom. To him, the sophists represent a legitimate source of political
agency, and authorize us to take stances and hold values in Derrida’s
deconstructive wake.

The sophists and neosophism can ultimately be seen as retaining

an optimism toward the possibility of persuasion and truth, an optimism

that is alien to deconstruction.6 As Jasper Neel maintains, “In contrast to
Derrida […] the sophists allow themselves to be persuaded by an argument,
while never forgetting the inadequate, deceitful foundation that enabled

I do not intend to imply a dualism between neosophism and Derridian
deconstruction—these antifoundationalist projects are in many ways quite
complimentary. In fact, Victor J. Vitanza warns us against dividing the two in his 1997
volume Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric: “Those of us in rhetoric
im/proper need to understand that the argument to reject deconstruction would be
comparable to the argument to reject rhetoric itself because it has no content, truth, and
politics!” (213). (Vitanza’s playful, punning, and sometimes frustrating writing style
echoes Derrida’s own, and is intended to remind us that postmodern academic prose
styles find historical precedent in the dithyrambic, “Gorgian” oratory style of the ancient
sophists.) Derrida himself, however, does not see deconstruction as a new sophistic
project. In his Dissemination he notes that the work is “at no time spurred on by some
slogan or a password of a ‘back-to-the-sophists’ nature” (108).
6
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the argument” (207, emphasis added). To Neel, sophism embraces the
possibility of meaning-making, but as he also clearly implies, this
optimism does not come at the expense of its central criticalness.

Feminist standpoint theory similarly retains an optimism toward

the possibility of knowledge creation, even as it is critical of traditional
epistemologies. Much like Bizzell, Haraway is also troubled by the

postmodern impasse. In her much-cited article “Situated Knowledges: The
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective”
(first published in 1988), Haraway writes:

I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for
deconstructing the claims of hostile science by showing the
radical historical specificity, and contestability, of every layer
of the onion of scientific and technological constructions,
and [instead] we end up with a kind of epistemological
electro-shock therapy, which far from ushering into the
high stakes tables of the game of contesting public truths,
lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple
personality disorder. (Simians 186)

Like Bizzell, Haraway is troubled by how the “acid tools of critical

discourse in the human sciences” (185) have seemingly eaten away at the
foundations of political agency and our grounds for making claims to
knowledge. She articulates the dilemma facing us as “how to have

simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all claims”
on one hand, while retaining “a no-nonsense commitment to faithful
accounts of a ‘real’ world” on the other hand (187).

Haraway’s response to this dilemma is to develop a critical, yet

positive epistemology, which she articulates as feminist objectivity rooted
in situated knowledges. In such an epistemology, rather than being

minimized or ignored as in traditional Western approaches, attention is

actually drawn toward the subjectivity and situatedness of the knowledge
producer—so that “partiality and not universality” then becomes “the
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condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims” (195). She
notes:

All Western cultural narratives about objectivity are
allegories of the ideologies of the relations of what we call
mind and body, of distance and responsibility, embedded in
the science question in feminism. Feminist objectivity is
about limited location and situated knowledge, not about
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. In this
way we might become answerable for what we learn how to
see. (190)

Haraway then identifies a historical precedent for the epistemic practice
that she describes. Parallel to Neel’s characterization of a sophistic

epistemology that recognizes the “deceit” inherent to all knowledge claims,
Haraway notes that “The Coyote or Trickster, embodied in American
Southwest Indian accounts, suggests our situation when we give up

mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be

hoodwinked” (199). Although the models and metaphors that Haraway

offers are decidedly positive, as with neosophism , their optimism toward

meaning-making does not come at the expense of their central criticalness.
Haraway joins a number of other feminist critiques in adopting

such an optimistic epistemic stance. In The Science Question in Feminism,
Sandra Harding writes:

I do not wish to be understood as recommending that we
throw out the baby with the bathwater. We do not imagine
giving up speaking or writing just because our language is
deeply androcentric; nor do we propose an end to
theorizing about social life once we realize that thoroughly
androcentric perspectives inform even our feminist
revisions of the social theories we inherit. Similarly, I am
not proposing that humankind would benefit from
renouncing attempts to describe, explain, and understand
the regularities, underlying causal tendencies, and meanings
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of the natural and social worlds just because the sciences we
have are androcentric. (10).

Even while participating in a direct critique of traditional scientific and
empiricist methodologies, Harding asserts the “need to work out an
epistemology that can account for both this reality that our best

knowledge is socially constructed, and also that it is empirically accurate”
(“Introduction” 12). She offers her own critical, yet productive

epistemology through the notion of strong objectivity: a feminist epistemic
stance which sees knowledge as “fully saturated with history and social life
rather than abstracted from it” (“Rethinking” 128).

Similarly, Kathi Weeks asserts the possibility of political agency

and meaning-making when she notes our desire to “endorse the critiques
of humanism, functionalism, determinism, and essentialism without

denying the possibility of agency” (181). As Susan Hekman notes, “the
postmoderns are correct: we live in a world devoid of a normative

metanarrative. But we can offer persuasive arguments in defense of our

values and the politics they entail” (“Truth” 238). And as Linda Alcoff and
Elizabeth Potter maintain, feminist epistemological projects have “sparked

a determination to reconstruct epistemology on newer, more self-conscious
ground” (3). So, while many feminist critiques are damning of our received
epistemologies, they also express a consistent optimism toward the

prospect of political agency and toward the possibility of knowledge

construction. This optimism, which is shared with many neosophistic
projects, stands as a compelling response to the postmodern impasse.

Conclusion

By showing—in parallel—the epistemic traces common to both

feminist critiques of science and neosophism, my intent in this chapter has
been twofold. First, I have sought to establish the overall methodological

complementarity of these two intellectual and political projects. Second, I
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have sought to describe the epistemic assumptions upon which a feministsophistic methodology is based. Such a methodology explicitly

foregrounds the role of the social in epistemology; denies any notion of
inviolable essences as the basis for epistemology; and not only remains

optimistic toward the possibility of meaning-making, but works actively to
create new epistemologies. Such a methodology stands in opposition to
traditional, foundationalist methodologies predicated on the modernist

notions of the autonomous subject and objectivity. In the next chapter, I
will work from the feminist-sophistic ideals sketched in this chapter

toward enacting them rhetorically in method. As I show, such a method
demands new critical attention to the ethical posture of researchers and

their presence as an agent within published research, demands recognition

of the practical disciplinary contexts that researchers address, and demands
a vigilant awareness of the rhetoricity of all scholarship.
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Chapter 3:
Rhetorically Enacting a Feminist-Sophistic Method
In the previous chapter, I described the overall epistemic stance

that informs this study. I argued that the connections between neosophism
and feminist critiques of science are multiple and complimentary, and,

taken together, these perspectives suggest the need for new epistemologies
to displace our received Platonic-Aristotelian tools for knowledge

production. I noted my wish to join feminist and neosophistic projects not
only in their critical opposition to many traditional epistemologies, but

also in their optimism toward the possibility of meaning-making and their
efforts to actively develop new ways of knowing. But most importantly, I
wish to engage in the sort of situated, ethical research that I find these
projects endorsing. In this chapter, I work from the feminist-sophistic

principles described in the previous chapter to describe their enactment in
method. More specifically, I describe how these principles are realized in
terms of the rhetorical stance I assume as a researcher.

My primary goal as a rhetor-researcher is to avoid what Donna J.

Haraway terms the “god-trick”: the act of producing knowledge that
pretends “to be from everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from

interpretation, from being represented, to be fully self-contained or fully

formalizable” (Simians 196). Similarly, paraphrasing Gorgias’ On Nature or
the Non-Existent, Bruce McComiskey asserts that in the genre of
neosophistic appropriation,

Historical reality does not exist in any essential form; even if
historical reality exists, historians can not know it except
through the process of interpretation; even if historians can
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know historical reality as it exists external to interpretation,
they cannot convey that historical reality to another person,
since language, like reality, is always interpreted. (Gorgias
56)

More pointedly, he notes, reality “is always already a politicized

representation with no originary presence” (80). Drawing from both

feminist and neosophistic stances, I attempt to remain mindful in this

study of the fact that the contemporary historical instance I examine “does
not exist in any essential form,” and that even if it did, I “can not know it

except through the process of interpretation” (56). To attempt otherwise,
as Haraway might note, is to attempt the god-trick. It is the ethical and
rhetorical posture of the god-trick that I believe a feminist-sophistic
method is ultimately articulated against.

In composing this study, I have done my best to avoid the

rhetorical moves common to god-trick scientific narratives. I try to resist

using the passive voice to disguise my own interpretive role as a researcher,
and I try to avoid the other familiar conceits of academic and scientific

report genres that would serve to obscure this study’s constructedness. I
attempt to couch my findings not as universal truths, but as paths for

moving forward in the conversation of a disciplinary community. And I try
to remain self-consciously aware that this study is a thoroughly rhetorical
act—it is only a single, (hopefully) persuasive account that I’ve composed
for specific audiences and specific purposes. I believe that these

approaches, which I will discuss in detail in the following sections, are

necessary to remain consistent with the feminist-sophistic principles I
outline in the previous chapter.

A Caveat

I begin with a caveat. Although I adopt a critical stance toward

traditional scientific epistemologies—and I take notable departures from
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traditional scientific methodologies—I do not wish to contribute to facile
generalizations and stereotyping about the epistemic activities of the

sciences, or to reduce nuanced considerations of epistemology to “us vs.

them” battles over academic turf. From C. P. Snow’s “two cultures,” to the
Sokal Affair and the “Science Wars” of the 1990s, there is no shortage of
recent warrants to further dichotomize the scientific and humanistic

perspectives. As Haraway bemusedly confesses, she has, at times, held her
own “paranoid fantasies and academic resentments” toward those in
scientific fields:

The imagined ‘they’ constitute a kind of invisible
conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete
with grants and laboratories; and the imagined ‘we’ are the
embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a
finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and
polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our
own little circles, where a ‘mass’-subscription journal might
reach a few thousand readers composed mostly of sciencehaters. (Simians 183)

But like Haraway, I wish to move beyond the scenario depicted in such a
characterization, and to avoid relying on “the mythic cartoons of physics

and mathematics—incorrectly caricatured in anti-science ideology as exact,
hyper simple knowledges—that have come to represent the hostile other
to feminist paradigmatic models of scientific knowledge” (196). I do not

want to articulate a feminist-sophistic method against inaccurate or unfair
depictions of what goes on “on the other end of campus.”

In fact, despite my own situation within the humanities, I would

concede that in many ways knowledge produced in the sciences can be
more self-consciously social, timely, and assailable than knowledge

produced in the humanities; likewise, scientific research practices can in

many ways be more situated and responsible. Here I turn to the example of
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our respective academic editorial styles, the most popular of which are the
Modern Language Association (MLA) style and the American

Psychological Association (APA) style. These styles, I believe, reflect some
of the central epistemic presumptions and scholarly values of the

humanistic and social scientific traditions.7 In her 2000 volume Composing
Research: A Contextualist Paradigm for Rhetoric and Composition, Cindy
Johanek notes that the use of MLA style in rhetoric, composition, and

literature makes research in those fields appear timeless and unassailable.
The MLA style manual’s insistence on using the present tense lends cited

research an aura of eternality, a grammatical feature that suggests “Once it
is published, it’s published. It’s ‘there.’ Forever” (191). As Johanek notes,
MLA

style

ties the theories, research, and pedagogies to their authors
in the present tense as if those authors still believe—still
currently “live” in—that theory, research, and pedagogy. In
other words, the present tense that MLA requires for
treatment of text, is transferred instead, in composition, to
treatment of authors. As a result, our criticism, citations, and
use of composition scholarship locks the author—rather
than the text—in present tense. (191)

Robert R. Connors provides a compelling account of the history and significance of
academic citation practices in his 1998 and 1999 articles “The Rhetoric of Citation
Systems, Part I: The Development of Annotation Structures from the Renaissance to
1900” and “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part II: Competing Epistemic Values in
Citation.” In these articles, Connors works to reveal the material, political, epistemic,
disciplinary, and practical factors that determine scholarly citation practices. As he notes,
while these practices have “silently undergirded the enterprise of Western intellectual
activity” and “Though these systems constrain many of the ways we deal with each other
and each other’s work, they have largely gone unremarked” (“Part II” 242).
7
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At least the within the field of composition, she advocates the use of APA
style, which instead permits the use of the past and present tenses for
different contexts and purposes.

This seemingly minor editorial feature is quite telling. Much

scholarly work in the humanities, whether consciously or not, reflects a

Platonic epistemology by adhering to MLA style. Contrary to the sophist’s
goal of inducing time-bound, kairotic beliefs within an audience through
rhetoric, Plato insisted on the philosophic goal of discovering eternal
knowledge (Truth) through dialectic (irrespective of any audience or

particular “knower”). The use of the present tense in MLA style is arguably

a latter-day incarnation of Plato’s insistence on the eternality of knowledge
claims achieved through dialectic: to Plato, true knowledge transcends

time. Meanwhile, the use of the past tense in APA style—not to mention
its explicit foregrounding of publication dates within parenthetical
citations—can be seen as a sophistic epistemic trait: it reflects an

informing presumption in the social sciences that knowledge claims are
temporary, assailable, time-bound, and even kairotic.8

Similarly, the use of MLA style in the humanities can be seen to

counter feminist epistemologies. Feminist standpoint theory and the

notion of situated knowledges suggest an explicit foregrounding of the
subjectivity and positionality of the researcher. By asserting the

In describing why scientific disciplines were among the first to abandon footnote
citation styles, Robert R. Connors notes that
8

footnote dating obscures chronological relationships, making
assessments about authorial relations and cumulating knowledge more
difficult. For the sciences, this lack of easy chronological access was
keenly felt, because new scientific discoveries do displace older ones,
and footnotes by 1900 were becoming a very troubling and
cumbersome way to report that reality. (“Part II,” 223)
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timelessness and context-independence of scholarly literature through use
of the present tense, the MLA style precludes the very sort of contextual
foregrounding that these feminist critiques advocate. The APA style, by
contrast, at least permits scholars and their ideas to be contextualized
chronologically by tense.

The use of verb tense in our academic styles is admittedly only one

small example —but I believe it demonstrates why it would be unfair and
inaccurate to critique the epistemic speck in the eye of the sciences (from
either a feminist or sophistic stance) given the log in the eye of the
humanities. As humanistic scholarship practices show us, a

foundationalizing impulse is not the hallmark of traditional science alone.
So I offer the disclaimer that the feminist-sophistic methods I describe
should be seen as articulated against not only traditional scientific

methods, but against foundationalism inscribed in any disciplinary
tradition.

Remaining Present in the Text

In rhetorically enacting a feminist-sophistic method, I first attempt

to avoid composing this study in ways that conceal my role as a researcher,
beginning with grammatical agency. As Joey Sprague notes in her 2005

volume Feminist Methodologies for Critical Researchers: Bridging Differences,
Passive voice does not just hide the agency of the
researcher; explanations in the passive voice hide social
power. […] In passive voice, people are fired or
impoverished, or rebellions are crushed. There may be
victims, but there are not clear agents, no one to whom we
can assign responsibility for outcomes. […] Using passive
voice when there are clear agents amounts to hiding the
exercise of power. (24)
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Although I hold no illusions about the gravity of the research I present
here—or about the power I hold as a graduate researcher in an obscure

scholarly niche—I do want to ensure that I remain present as an agent in

the text of this study. I intend to accomplish this in part by using the active
voice and the first person singular consistently in this work, with the
marked exception of a section appearing near the end of the study.

Although stylistically this approach may be at odds with accepted

academic and scientific report genres, I intend for my subtle shift in

grammatical agency to carry with it a (likewise subtle) shift in ethical

agency. As Haraway notes in her call to develop a feminist objectivity
rooted in situated knowledges, “Feminists don’t need a doctrine of

objectivity that promises transcendence, a story that loses track of its

mediations just where someone might be held responsible for something,
and unlimited instrumental power” (Simians 187). By “appearing”

grammatically within the text of this study, I hope to write a story where

my mediate role is foregrounded and my subjectivity is evident, and I hope
to at least begin to remain accountable in the way that Haraway calls for.9
My use of the active voice and the first person are also consistent

with a sophistic theoretical orientation. In his 1988 volume Plato, Derrida,
and Writing, Japer Neel explores how voice and textual “presence” work
within Plato’s Phaedrus. He notes that “Perhaps Plato’s most brilliant
insight was to realize how difficult disputing his texts would be if he

removed himself from them by taking on the role of recording secretary
for the martyred, authoritatively dead Socrates” (9). Plato, he notes, is

To be sure, I am not calling for textual presence in the sense of an “authorial voice” or
“personal style.” The individualistic and modernist assumptions attendant to these
expressivist ideals, I hold, ultimately contradict my feminist-sophistic stance. For a
thoughtful consideration of the personal voice in scholarship, see Johanek, ch. 7.
9
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utterly absent as an agent within the Phaedrus (15, 17), representing a

written style and ethical posture intended to “Have us believe that no one
is in control, that it is a disinterested movement toward truth set in

operation and kept in motion by the power of dialectic as exercised by the
superior philosopher, Socrates” (14).

Plato’s absence/deferral of agency in the Phaedrus represents a

historical precedent for our inherited academic and scientific writing
styles—styles that likewise project a character of innocence and

disinterestedness through the artful determination of voice and agency.
Neel, like Sprague, identifies within such writing the machinations of
power:

Undeniably, Platonic writing has a powerful attraction.
Those who embark on it can believe themselves to have
superior souls, souls that wish to escape the limitations of
the human condition. Merely embarking on the never-tobe-completed journey toward truth sets these people apart
as philosopher-kings who can revel in the satisfaction of
knowing their love of wisdom should place them in roles of
social authority. (97)

By attempting to give up the passive, disinterested voice of the Platonic

writing style, I hope to shed any indications of a metaphysical orientation
or any aspirations to the superior status of a philosopher-king.

This sophistic move potentially threatens my most immediate

rhetorical goals: by taking this approach, I will give up the suasive power

attendant to an objectivist, disembodied textual voice. Whatever rhetorical

power my argument can be said to have, then, will remain a closer function
of the ethos I actively work to develop in this study, rather than the ethos I
work to disguise. As I hope to show in the course of this study, this

apparently weaker role not only represents a more ethical and accountable
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means of knowledge production, but it can also represent a persuasive,

reliable, and ultimately truthful account of our shared experience. While
using the active voice and the first person are admittedly minor

grammatical moves, I believe their ethical, epistemic, and rhetorical
consequences are appreciable.

Remaining Grounded in a Practical Disciplinary Context

Second, I attempt to couch the results of this study not as universal

truths, but as paths for moving forward in the conversation of a

discipline—specifically the discipline of technical communication. As I

alluded to in my introduction, Mailloux and other scholars have argued

that there is a notable complementarity between sophism and pragmatist
philosophy (Rhetoric). Pragmatism holds that

the whole “meaning” of a conception expresses itself in
practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of
conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be
expected, if the conception be true; which consequences
would be different if it were untrue, and must be different
from the consequences by which the meaning of other
conceptions is in turn expressed. (William James, qtd. in
Mailloux, Rhetoric 4)

Contrary to a Platonic stance holding that the pursuit of knowledge is its
own reward and that the discovery of knowledge is its own justification,
pragmatism asserts that the very notions of knowledge and theory are

always already circumscribed and determined by their practical application.
Rather than aspiring to the status of transcendent and eternal truth,

knowledge and theory instead find their significance only when articulated
against specific problems within specific contexts.

Like pragmatism, a sophistic epistemology is concerned with the

practical effects of the knowledge it produces. As Michael C. Leff notes in
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his 1987 chapter “Modern Sophistic and the Unity of Rhetoric,”

“Sophistic implies a pluralism in which methods of inquiry and argument
are adapted to the particular subject under investigation. It seeks to solve

situated problems rather than to formulate abstract theoretical principles”
(24). He goes on to note that

The philosophy of action advocated by both the ancient
and modern sophists has little meaning until it engages
specific activities. Sophistic is a field-dependent approach
that relies on concrete [as opposed to abstract] models.
Thus, the coherence of the program requires the generation
of a model that encompasses the unity of form and content,
of perspective and action, in respect to some domain of
practice. (24)

The study I am composing, then, should not be seen as engaging in the

production of abstract, theoretical knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Rather,
this study emerges from specific scholarly conversations arising within the

context of the North American, postmillennial, academic field of technical
communication. It seeks only to meet the practical needs of that field and
to solve a finite number of problems relevant to its members. Far from a

contemplative, disinterested search for a universal or totalizing Truth, this
study self-consciously emerges from—and is intended to speak to—the
practices of this specific scholarly community.

In a similar fashion, feminist critiques of science also serve to draw

our attention to the practical ends of research and knowledge making. As
Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter note in the introduction to their 1993
collection Feminist Epistemologies, feminist scholarship first emerged in

practical, “applied” academic fields such as applied ethics. As they note, it
is no coincidence that these fields
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were and are viewed by most professional philosophers as
“on the periphery” of central philosophical work, where the
virtue of centrality is accorded to work with a greater
degree of abstraction from concrete material reality and
with pretensions to universality. Feminist philosophers
began work in the applied areas because feminism is, first
and last, a political movement concerned with practical
issues, and feminist philosophers understood their
intellectual work to be a contribution to the public debate
on crucial practical issues. (2)

Reflecting their own political origins, then, many feminist projects eschew
the conception of epistemology as idle abstraction in favor of its
conception as active, practical engagement.

In their article “Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” Vrinda Dalmiya

and Linda Alcoff offer a vivid illustration of the dangers of separating the
act of knowledge production from its practical ends. Here they relate the
historical example of midwifery’s displacement by medical obstetrics,
which had disastrous effects on quality of care for women:

In Europe, when physicians were finally able to wrest
obstetrics from the monopoly of the midwife, the result was
an epidemic of death for the mothers. The cause was
puerperal, or “childbed,” fever, which afflicted women by
the thousands across European cities in the nineteenth
century. This fever was produced by the unclean hands of
the birth attendant, and although midwives at the time
were just as ignorant as physicians about the bacterial
sources of diseases, they had the advantage over physicians
in that they saw no other patients and were unlikely to
carry germs from dying patients to the absorptive tissues of
the open womb. (222–23)

The significance of this story, Dalmiya and Alcoff note, is that the

epistemic and professional success of obstetrics was in no way predicated
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on its practical success—it held no instrumental advantage over midwifery.
Rather, obstetrics’ success was held in delegitimizing the practical,

noncodifiable knowledges of the midwife, and by extension, delegitimizing
their profession. It was, as Dalmiya and Alcoff note, simply a “triumph of
propositional knowledge over practical knowledge” (223).

This historical example demonstrates how traditional

epistemologies can serve to render invisible other valid and successful
practical knowledges. It demonstrates that the preoccupation with

disengagement and abstraction found in Western scientific epistemologies
carries with it clear moral and ethical consequences. And it cautions

researchers against separating the creation of knowledge from the practical
ends of that knowledge. As Dalmiya and Alcoff note:

Knowing is not necessarily a matter of saying and
representing what is the case but can also be a kind of
practical involvement with the world. So the short and
direct route of justifying the cognitive import of knowing
how is to simply take the bull by the horns and deny the
watertight distinction between the pragmatic and the
epistemic. (235)

In composing this study rhetorically, I attempt to remain mindful of this
conception of knowing, as well as the consequences of ignoring the

practical roots of knowledge claims. The pragmatic orientation common to
both feminist theory and neosophism informs this study by cautioning me

to remain attentive to the specific audiences and contexts that I intend this
study to speak to, and the specific problems that I intend for it to address.
So rather than articulating the findings of this study as revealed universal
truths or transcendent theories, I hope the rhetoric of this study will

instead reflect humbler aims: to help administrators, scholars, and teachers
in the field of technical communication better understand baccalaureate
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and certificate programs and to help them achieve practical ends within
their own contexts (such as making decisions about the programs they
administer, marshaling arguments for material support, benchmarking
their programs, etc.).

Remaining Aware of the Inherent Rhetoricity of Scholarship

Finally, I try to remain self-consciously aware of the fact that this

study, like all studies, is thoroughly rhetorical. In his 1966 article “On

Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Robert L. Scott argues that rhetoric is

more than simply “a matter of giving effectiveness to truth,” but rather of
actually “creating truth” (135). By suggesting the possibility of an

epistemic role to rhetoric, Scott’s article went on to spark an extensive

awakening to the role of rhetoric in the human sciences, and launched
what is known as the “rhetoric of science” movement. This body of

scholarship emerged from speech communication during the 1970s
(Mailloux, Disciplinary 26), but draws on voices from a number of

disciplines to describe the persuasive functioning of scientific research and
academic scholarship (Kinneavy 197–8).

As Herbert W. Simons notes in his 1990 introduction to The

Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry, it isn’t
just “that scientific discourse is inherently rhetorical at the point of

paradigm clash” (8)—that is, the point at which new theories must gain
sufficient assent to displace older, disproven theories. Rather,

Broadly speaking, virtually all scholarly discourse is
rhetorical in the sense that issues need to be named and
framed, facts interpreted and conclusions justified;
furthermore in adapting arguments to ends, audiences, and
circumstances, the writer (or speaker) must adopt a persona,
choose a style, and make judicious use of what Kenneth
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Burke has called the “resources of ambiguity” in language.
(9)

Following this central premise of the rhetoric of science movement, the

present study can only claim to be what all scholarship is: a rhetorical act.
This study cannot claim to articulate universal truth; its persuasive effect

very much depends on the rhetorical variables of audience, context, kairos,
and to prepon. This study also cannot claim to be equally persuasive to all
audiences; I do not presume that those who remain unpersuaded by the

logic of this study (as, say, an articulation of universal reason) are defective.
Instead, this study only claims to be a concerted attempt to coalesce my

own disparate observations, and the observations of others, into an account
that is persuasive to a specific scholarly audience in the field of technical
communication.

By asserting the inherent rhetoricity of this study, I don’t mean to

suggest that it’s only “mere” rhetoric—I don’t, in other words, hold that
this study is just a load of opportunistic, untethered blather. Rather, in

asserting the rhetoricity of this work, I believe I also assert its fundamental
connections to an audience and—socially constructed as they may be—the
standards that audience holds for what constitutes a persuasive claim.
Asserting the rhetoricity of this work in no way constitutes license to

arbitrarily write my own epistemic and scholarly conventions; rather, it is a

reminder that I defy existing conventions only at my own rhetorical peril. I
believe this approach to be both rigorous and ethical.

Although by foregrounding this work’s status as rhetoric I open

myself up to the charge that I’m unconcerned with methodological rigor, I

believe that this is not the case. By abandoning the powerfully suasive godtricks of a disembodied scholarly ethos, I believe that I am compelled to
state my case even more explicitly than I would be otherwise. That is,
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rather than relying on the god-trick to present an infallible account of the
“real world,” my accounts must instead be couched solely in terms of my,
and my audience’s, justifications for knowing. At no time can I defer the

proclamation of knowledge to an invisible, textual deity. My “presence” as
a fallible researcher in the text of this study, I believe, actually encourages

more rigor, since it invites my audience to doubt me and my accounts in a
way that the god-trick does not.

Likewise, by foregrounding this work’s status as rhetoric, I open

myself up to the millennia-old charge that I’m unconcerned with ethics.

That is, if this study is “nothing more than” rhetoric, surely I as the rhetor
must be concerned with “nothing more than” winning assent at any cost.
However, my desire to succeed rhetorically within the specific, socially

situated agon that this study speaks to compels me toward ethical action: it
compels me to articulate my argument in terms of the values held by my

audience. As Jarratt notes, the etymology of the word “ethics” reminds us

of their connection to the social: “ethics,” she notes “are inseparable from

ethe, a word meaning ‘haunts,’ or, even more colloquially, ‘hang outs’ and by
extension ‘habits’ or ‘practices.’” (Rereading 96). What constitutes the

standard of ethical action for this study, then, are the values common to
the “haunt” that I inhabit and speak to: in this case, a community of

careful, committed, and critical scholars in the academic field of technical
communication.

This audience would rightfully be alarmed—and would ultimately

discount my arguments—if, say,
•

I showed no evidence of obtaining Institutional Review
Board (IRB) oversight for my research;

•

if my survey didn’t live up to the commonly accepted
standards of research design;
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•

if I presented hasty, illogical, or irresponsible conclusions
from the data I develop;

•
•

if I demonstrated significant conflicts of interest; or
if I committed any one of countless other ethical-

methodological transgressions determined by the discursive
community of academic technical communication.

I want to be absolutely clear, however, that my concern with the values of

this community are not just instrumental: I don’t follow these ethical

guidelines simply because I stand to win or lose a particular argument, or
because I stand to craft a persuasive claim or not. I am concerned with
these values because, as a member of the discursive community of

academic technical communication myself, they are my values as well. As
Jarratt’s etymology reminds us, what I describe above aren’t simply ethos
problems—they are substantial ethics problems.

Although the relativist ethical stance I am describing can seem

terrifying to staunch foundationalists (see Harris), I, for one, take comfort
knowing that the values I speak from (and to) are shared, and not the

product of a pernicious solipsism. As R. Scott reminds us, the alternative
to a socially oriented stance is dangerous: “The man [sic] who views

himself as the instrument of the state, or of history, or of certain truth of
any sort puts himself beyond ethical demands, for he says, in effect, ‘It is

not I who am responsible’” (“On Viewing” 137). It bears pointing out that
the stance Scott characterizes here is, in essence, the god-trick.

Contrasting such a stance, he notes, “one who acts without certainty must

embrace the responsibility for making his acts the best possible” (137). It is
this very sort of accountability that the feminist-sophistic method in this
study aspires to.
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Finally, by asserting the rhetoricity of this work, I believe that I also

assert the collective role we play in the social construction of our ethics. In

other words, by foregrounding the epistemic function of persuasion in this
study (rather than using the god-trick to obscure it), I believe I also draw

attention to how we collectively maintain (or as necessary, resist and revise)
what we count as persuasive—that is, what we decide to value. To Scott,

this sort of collective participation is vital: “Inaction, failure to take on the
burden of participating in the development of contingent truth, ought to

be considered ethical failure” (16). Following this, it is my contention, and

the contention of many feminist and neosophistic voices, that the time has
come to resist and revise certain aspects of our received scientific and

academic methods. As a necessary first step toward such revision, I argue,
we must foreground the mutability and rhetoricity of our methods.
In this chapter, I have sketched a number of pathways for

rhetorically enacting a feminist-sophistic method. Admittedly, they

represent only small starts toward the end of realizing a more embodied,
situated, and ultimately ethical epistemology; my shifts in written style
and rhetorical and ethical posture do not, in their sum, represent an

entirely radical overhaul of our received methods of knowledge production.
In fact, I suspect that the chapters that follow may come across as more
evolutionary than revolutionary. But as Elizabeth Fee notes, simply

imagining—let alone realizing—a wholly feminist epistemology may be
impossible in the current androcentric paradigm:

For us to imagine a feminist science in a feminist society is
rather like asking a medieval peasant to imagine the theory
of genetics or the production of a space capsule; our images
are, at best, likely to be sketchy and unsubstantial. (qtd. in
Harding, Science 138)
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Still, I believe that the attempts I have made to enact a feminist-sophistic
method in this study draw critical attention toward the rhetorical

techniques common to traditional scientific and academic research. These
subtle shifts serve as a reminder of the rhetoricity, social constructedness,
situatedness, and partiality of all knowledge claims. And ultimately, I
maintain, these shifts work against the god-trick as an entrenched
rhetorical feature of our received epistemologies.

In the next chapter, I turn away from method in terms of rhetorical

enactment toward method in the more traditional terms of performing the
research. I discuss in detail how I determined my survey sample and how I
executed the survey itself. It is, admittedly, a less ruminative and self-

introspective chapter than the present one. However, in it I continue to
employ—as I have striven to throughout this study—the rhetorical
strategies that I believe characterize a feminist-sophistic method.
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Chapter 4:
Method for Surveying United States Baccalaureate and
Certificate Programs in Technical Communication
In the previous chapter, I discussed my strategies for enacting a

feminist-sophistic method in terms of the rhetorical stance I adopt as a
researcher. In this chapter, I discuss my method in (the perhaps more

traditional) terms of how I executed the research. My first step in this

process was to seek approval for this study from Michigan Technological
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). On 1 February 2008 was

granted approval and exemption from further IRB review under protocol

#M0291. From there, I turned to the survey itself. Because the survey was
to be mailed, I elected to restrict the sample to programs in the United

States for reasons of cost. And because the original call from the CPTSC
was for research into academic programs, I also elected to restrict the
sample to academic programs alone. With these basic parameters
established, I then set about determining the survey sample and

composing and executing the survey itself. I discuss each of these
procedures in detail in the remainder of the chapter.

Determining the Sample

Previous studies of technical communication academic programs

take a number of varied approaches to determining their samples. In his
1995 work “Assumptions about Technical Communication Programs”
appearing in the proceedings of the STC, Kenneth T. Rainey surveys a

“representative sample of 50 schools” selected from the 140 programs “that
we know about” (40). His survey method remains largely unarticulated,
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however: Rainey makes no mention of how the 140 programs were

identified or how the 50 surveyed programs were chosen, and he provides
no elaboration on his claim to the representativeness of the sample.

In his 2001 National Communication Association presentation, “A

Curricular Profile of United States Technical Communication

Departments at the Beginning of the 21st Century,” Earl McDowell

draws his sample of programs from the STC Academic Programs database
(then at <http://www.stc-va.org/scripts.school>). McDowell attempts to
visit the websites of 100 of the 148 baccalaureate programs in technical

communication found in the database, and he is able to find “significant
information” online for the curricula for 60 of those programs (16

community colleges and 44 four-year institutions) (7). It is not clear,

however, how McDowell selected his sample 100 programs from the

initial population of 148 programs. He does not provide criteria for which
programs were excluded, why programs were excluded, or if the selection
of excluded programs was systematic. He also provides no discussion of
how limiting his study to those programs with curriculum information
available online might affect the results (i.e. selection bias).

In my 2003 study of certificate programs in technical

communication (“Looking”), I also rely on the STC database (then at

<http://www.stc.org/academicDatabase.asp>) as the source for my sample.
Unlike McDowell, however, I place a number of qualifications on which
programs I survey. I include in my study those programs from the STC
database meeting all of the following criteria:
•

The certificate program is expressly in “technical
communication” or “technical writing”;

•

The certificate is an independent degree, and is not required to
be earned concurrently with another degree as a minor would
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be (however, programs can prerequire a degree for admission to
the program);
•

Sufficient information is available online to determine the
program’s curriculum and course requirements; and

•

The program information is available in English and courses
are taught in English.

Applying these criteria, I exclude 60 of the 122 initial programs listed in

the STC database: 6 for being duplicates of other records in the database,
32 for being misidentified as certificate programs or offering no

identifiable certificate program in technical communication, 9 for

requiring a concurrent degree (specifically, a bachelor’s degree), 9 for not
having sufficient program information available online, and 4 for being
offered in a foreign language. Although I express my belief that these

exclusions do not “significantly impair the usefulness of the data,” I do
speculate on how my sample selection could introduce some bias:

By excluding nine programs for not having sufficient
information online, for instance, I may have encouraged an
overrepresentation of digital technology courses, as the lack
of sufficient web presence at those institutions may
conceivably also reflect the lack of major technology
initiatives, training, or funding. In addition, by limiting the
study to independent certificate programs (which do not
require a concurrent degree), I may have also encouraged a
small overrepresentation of industry-connected programs in
the surveys […] Such programs, lacking the “captive
audience” of an undergraduate student body, may have a
greater incentive to recruit students and feedback from local
industry.
In their 2004 study “TPC Program Snapshots: Developing

Curricula and Addressing Challenges,” Nancy Allen and Steven T.
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Benninghoff take a slightly different approach to selecting their sample.

They actively, if unsystematically, augment a program directory maintained
by the Association for Teachers of Technical Writing (ATTW ) with “other
schools whose faculty members are frequent contributors to discussion of
program issues on ATTW-L (ATTW email-discussion list)” (160). They

don’t specify which programs came from which source, but in all they
indentify 73 baccalaureate programs for participation in their survey.

Regarding the representativeness of this sample, they acknowledge that

“Although the list of participating schools includes only a slice of all the
programs in the county, it represents a broad range of large and small
schools spanning the Carnegie Corporation’s categories from

baccalaureate/associate’s colleges to doctoral/research universities—
extensive” (160).

And in their 2005 study, Sandi Harner and Anne Rich rely on the

STC Academic

Programs Database (then at <http://www.stc.org/

academicDatabase.asp>) to determine the programs in their sample. Using
a method much like McDowell’s and Nugent’s, of the 133 baccalaureate

programs they find in the STC database, they examine the online curricula
for 80 programs across 75 different institutions (210). Like McDowell,
Harner and Rich do not discuss how and why programs were excluded

from their sample. But they make an notable move to foreground some of
their assumptions about the types of programs in their sample:

The introduction to the STC database states, “To assist
those interested in pursuing a career in technical
communication, STC provides a database of academic
programs worldwide. Schools are welcome to add their
programs to the database.” So we assume that if a program
director has entered information, the goal of that program
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is to prepare students “interested in pursuing a career in
technical communication.” (210)

Most of these studies on academic programs draw at least some

portion of their sample from a major program directory, and in doing so,
make assumptions (whether articulated or not) about the completeness
and representativeness of those directories. Each study also makes

assumptions about “what counts” as a program for the purposes of their
research, and assumes that the programs that “count” are represented in

their samples. These assumptions, and the diverse methods these studies
ultimately employ, demonstrate just how challenging sample

determination is for research on academic programs in technical

communication. As I identify, determining the sample breaks down into
two corollary problems:

1. finding what programs are in existence, and

2. determining meaningful criteria for which programs to
survey.

In the following sections, I discuss how I address both of these problems
in the present research.

Finding What Programs are in Existence

Beginning with the first problem, despite previous studies’ reliance

on program directories, no complete and authoritative list of programs in

technical communication can be said to exist, making it difficult to initiate
systematic research of technical communication programs. While

independent directories of academic and commercial programs in

technical communication are maintained by each the STC, the CPTSC, and
the ATTW, a close examination of their contents reveals notable gaps and
oversights: a number of programs appear in one directory but not the

others; some programs are absent entirely from the directories; and, as I
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came to find, programs offering certificates are notably underrepresented
across all three directories.

The STC Academic Programs database (available at <http://

www.stc.org/academic>) has been hosted by the society since at least the

year 2001 (DuBay). However, the database contents are not maintained by
any central authority. Rather, all of the information in the database is self-

reported, and is frequently incomplete or inaccurate (see Latterell 323). In
response to efforts to improve the quality of the directory, the STC

Academic Programs Database underwent “major changes” in 2007,

including the deletion of a significant number of records. A call was
circulated that year for programs to re-enter their data using a new

database web interface (Henschel), which led to a reduction in the number
of listed programs. For instance, in 2005 the STC database reported 133
baccalaureate programs in technical communication (Harner and Rich

210), but in March 2008 the database reported only 65 such programs.

While the STC Academic Programs database is one of the largest and most
complete technical communication program directories—not to mention
an invaluable resource to the field—it is by no means complete,
comprehensive, and stable.

To generate a more comprehensive sample source for this study, I

set about creating my own directory of United States programs in
technical communication at all levels (certificates, baccalaureates,

baccalaureate concentrations, minors, associates, masters, and doctorates).
To provide a starting point, I first aggregated the contents of the existing
program directories into one database. On 9 March 2008, I visited the
websites of the STC, CPTSC, and ATTW directories, and—through a

monotonous routine of “copy/paste” from my web browser—I pulled

program information appearing in them into a single Microsoft Access
80

database. I first copied all 100 entries for United States academic programs
from the STC Academic Programs Database. I then turned to the CPTSC

Program List, first created in September 2007 (Bridgeford, “CPTSC”) and

available at <http://www.cptsc.org/proglist>. Of the 64 total entries in the
CPTSC

Program List, I found and copied into my database 21 entries for

United States academic programs not already appearing in the STC

Academic Programs Database. Finally, of the 77 total entries appearing in
the ATTW programs directory (available at <http://cms.english.ttu.edu/
attw/programs>), I found and copied into my database 13 entries for
United States programs not appearing in either the STC Academic
Programs Database or the CPTSC Program List. This yielded an

aggregated directory of 134 unique technical communication programs—
34 programs (34%) more than found in the STC Academic Programs
Database alone.

However, after performing a few subsequent, informal web

searches, I identified webpages for additional programs not appearing in
any of the three major program directories. In attempt to correct such
omissions, I systematically searched the web for overlooked technical

writing and technical communication programs. Over the course of 9–14
March 2008, I performed web searches using Google (at <http://

www.google.com>), querying in order—and without quotation marks—
the following phrases:

1. technical writing program,

2. technical communication program,

3. technical communication certificate, and
4. technical writing certificate.

Reading each of the top 600 results for each of these queries, I recorded
every program I came across that met all of these criteria:
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•
•
•

it was an academic program offered in the United States;

it did not already appear in my aggregated programs database;

it offered a certificate, baccalaureate degree, or graduate degree
expressly in technical communication, technical writing,
professional communication, or professional writing;

•

it did not already appear in my previous search results.

The four queries listed above yielded, in sequence, 11, 9, 12, and 6

additional programs meeting these criteria. Adding these programs to my
aggregated program database yielded a comprehensive directory of 172

United States technical communication programs—72 programs (72%)

more than the STC Academic Programs Database alone and 38 programs
(28%) more than the major three directories combined. Although it is
obviously impossible to verify if every U.S. technical communication

program is contained in this directory, I believe that it represents a more
comprehensive sample source for program research than any other
currently available.

I also turned to the web to insure the completeness of program

data within the comprehensive directory. The types of data recorded in the
STC, CPTSC, and ATTW
STC

directories vary considerably. In the case of the

Academic Programs Database, the information available include the

name of the institution; the official names and types of programs offered;
the name, email address, mailing address, and phone number of a contact

person; and the URL of the program webpage. The information I gathered

from the CPTSC Program List varies by each program entry, but all entries
provide at least the name of the institution and the URL of the program

webpage. Some entries also provide the official name of the program and

the name and email address of a contact person. The information available
from the ATTW programs directory is limited strictly the name of the
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institution and the URL of the program webpage. Regardless of the source
of the information, however—whether it was the STC, CPTSC, or ATTW

directories, or whether it was from a web search—I amended as necessary

each of the 172 entries in the comprehensive database to include all of the
following data:
•
•
•
•
•

the name of the institution;

the name of the department;

the names and types of degrees offered;
the URL of the program webpage; and

information for a contact person or department head, including
o name,

o mailing address,

o email address (when available), and
o phone number (when available).

I gathered these additional data during 9–14 March 2008 by visiting

program webpages, navigating university websites, and by performing

Google web searches as needed. The names and addresses of programs

contained in the comprehensive program directory appear in Appendix A.
Through the process of aggregating and examining existing

program directories, and later by systematically searching the web for
overlooked programs, I was not only able to develop a more

comprehensive database of United States technical communication

programs to use as the sample for the present survey, but I was also able to
reveal a number of oversights in our current accounting of programs. As I
found, programs offering a certificate are disproportionately

underrepresented in the three major program directories. Of the 134 total
U.S. technical communication programs listed in the combined major
program directories, 56 (41%) offer a certificate. Of the 38 additional
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programs that I found through Google web searches, 33 (86%) offer a
certificate. That is, programs excluded from the three major program

directories are more than twice as likely to offer a certificate than those
that were included. Correcting this underrepresentation is, of course,
particularly important in light of the present research.
Determining Which Programs to Study

The second major challenge for program research is determining

criteria for which programs to survey. Since, as I found, the major program
directories are inadequate sample sources for this study, I had to augment
them with web research to create a more comprehensive program list. In

compiling this list, I was immediately faced with an important (if fraught)
methodological question: what exactly defines a program in “technical

communication”? What set of criteria can I apply to a given program to
systematically determine whether it actually “counts” as a technical
communication program? As I develop the directory through web

searches, what terms do I use for the queries? For instance, on top of
querying “technical communication program,” “technical writing

program,” “technical communication certificate,” and “technical writing

certificate,” should I also query the phrases “professional writing program”
and “professional writing certificate”? Are technical communication/
writing programs the same as professional communication/writing
programs, or are they essentially different?

To many teachers and scholars in the field of technical

communication—where the prefixes “technical,” “professional,” or even

“business” are frequently conflated—this last question may seem moot. As

reflected in the titles of the field’s most prominent scholarly journals, we’re
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apparently comfortable with a wide range of descriptors for “what we do”
in technical communication:
•
•
•
•

Journal of Technical Writing and Communication,

Journal of Technical and Business Communication,
Business Communication Quarterly,

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Transactions
on Professional Communication,

•
•

Technical Communication, and

Technical Communication Quarterly.

And as I found, of the 139 programs listed in the STC, CPTSC, and ATTW
directories combined—that is, programs that have self-identified as

technical communication/writing programs—60 (43%) offer at least one
program (certificate, baccalaureate, baccalaureate concentration, minor,

associates, masters, or doctorate) containing the word “professional,” such
as professional writing, professional communication, public and

professional writing, etc. At least superficially, it seems, the distinction
between “technical” and “professional” is not immediately apparent.

In fact, many “professional” writing/communication programs

prove on close examination to be indistinguishable from programs

expressly in technical communication. However a significant number of
such programs also prove themselves to be substantively afield. For

instance, in performing a Google web query for “professional writing

program” in August 2008, the first listed result is for the website of The

University of Maryland’s Professional Writing Program (PWP). According
to their website,

The program offers courses in Science Writing (English
390), Argumentation/Advanced Composition (English
391), Legal Writing (English 392), Technical Writing
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(English 393), Business Writing (English 394), and
Writing for the Health Professions (English 395), and
Special Topics in Professional Writing (English 398). For
each of these Professional Writing courses, syllabi are
designed to permit and foster growth in rhetorical and
language skills:
• students will become more aware of the ethos
they project, and more adept at defining and
analyzing audiences.

• students will learn how to research topics in the
“real world” and will engage in research; all PWP
courses entail a significant research component.
• students will learn to plan their work according
to audience and purpose.

• students will learn when and how to reveal their
rhetorical plan to facilitate readability.
• students will write in a style suitable to
audience and occasion.

• students will participate in draft workshop
sessions, allowing groups of students to test their
claims, and to engage in the sort of dialogue that
joins an expert in one field with an expert in
another.

• students will be prepared for writing,
communication, and research beyond the classroom.
(“PWP’s Program”)

The emphases here on audience, purpose, ethos, process, and real-world
contexts reflects the rhetorical orientation of the PWP curriculum: an
orientation consistent with the current best practices in technical

communication pedagogy. By those measures—even with the program’s

“professional writing” moniker—I think few educators or scholars in the
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field would find significant differences between it and a majority of other
programs expressly in technical communication. Nor do I believe they
would they hesitate to declare the PWP curriculum an adequate
professional preparation for a technical communicator.

In marked contrast, however, is the second listed result from the

same Google web query: the University of Southern California (USC)

Master of Professional Writing program (“Master”). The program boasts
“An interdisciplinary approach uniting five disciplines: fiction, creative

non-fiction, poetry, screenwriting, and playwriting.” The website also touts
the program’s “Proximity to Los Angeles’ entertainment and literary

industries.” While USC’s program, like Maryland’s PWP, is expressly in

“professional writing,” I think few educators or scholars in the field would
recognize it as a “technical communication” or even “technical

communication-related” program. And given USC’s apparent goal of

preparing writers for the entertainment and literary professions, I think

even fewer would agree that the program represents adequate professional
preparation for a technical communicator. (They might, however, find
some amusement in the program’s particular use of the word
“interdisciplinary.”)

These examples demonstrate that the common belief that

“professional” and “technical” are interchangeable does not always hold. In
fact, in my examination of the 98 subsequent results from the same web

search, I found that 7 of the 10 new programs I came across (that is, the
programs not already listed in my comprehensive program directory)

appeared to offer more preparation in creative, literary, or dramatic writing
than in technical, scientific, non-fiction, or workplace communication—a
pattern I did not witness in my search for “technical writing” and

“technical communication” programs/certificates. This is, of course, a
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casual and unsystematic interpretation of these programs’ offerings, and

given the intractable challenges of methodically quantifying or qualifying
these “outlier” programs, I don’t intend to represent these as anything
more than anecdotal findings. However, they seem to suggest that

differences between expressly “professional” programs and expressly

“technical” programs are more substantive than frequently acknowledged.

Rather kairotically, a discussion arose on the ATTW listserv in April

2008 about this very issue. While the discussion is wide-ranging and

illuminating, the respondents—who include notable scholars in the field of
technical communication—are far from unanimous in their stance or

approach to the issue. Most contributors to this conversation seem to

agree, however, that “professional” and “technical” communication/writing
are not identical. The discussion begins with a request from Thomas Orr:
“Could someone point me to some generally-agreed-upon definitions of

“professional communication” and “technical communication” that clarify
the differences between the two?” By the following day, this request had
elicited 13 responses.

Brenton Faber is the first to reply, and discusses some of the

implications of the debate for the project of professionalizing the field. He
suggests that, “Other than for reasons of efficiency (which is generally not
a quality of professional work) or exigence (again....) we have little actual
theoretical or emprical [sic] support for combining professional and

technical the way we usually do.” Daniel Tripp seconds Faber’s assertion
that professional and technical are not synonymous:

While searching through job ads over the past two years, I
have noticed a lot of variances in what English
department’s consider to be “professional writing.” For
some, it means technical writing, business writing, etc.
Others consider it to be creative non-fiction, freelance
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writing, etc. Some even seem to mean journalism or public
relations/marketing.

Meanwhile, other respondents take a stab at providing firm

distinctions between technical and professional. Stephen A. Bernhardt
offers a very succinct definition:

I use professional to include a broader reach than technical,
which tends to include engineering, computer science,
agriculture. Professional includes the broad classes of
college educated workers. There is also the meaning of
“professional schools,” such as law, medicine, pharmacy, etc.
(“Reminder”)

Peter England, offers a definition by way of hearsay:

I heard someone outside our field make an excellent
argument distinguishing professional from technical
communication. She said that technical communication is
distinguished by the level of detailed knowledge.
Professional communication could be something shared by
human resources, engineers, lawyers, nurses, etc.
Professional communication is the thing we do to make our
jobs work. Technical communication, however, is something
we do to make our specific jobs work—communicating
something about your individual field. In this sense,
“technical” means specialized or detailed.

Thomas Barker concedes his doubt that “accepted scholarly distinctions

exist” between technical and professional, but he goes on to relate in detail
a working list of distinctions between the two. The multiple points of

difference he identifies concern mostly the context of professional practice.
For instance, he describes technical communicators as “persons in .com

organizations writing product use documents, marketing communication,

help systems” while professional communicators are “lone writers in org or
gov settings writing proposals, white papers, and policy.” And Susan L.
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Popham takes a notably different tack by turning her critical attention not

to the word “professional,” but to the word “technical.” She asks if we “can
we come to an equally theoretical definition of ‘technical,’ something

besides ‘writing in workplaces’ or ‘writing about technologized things’?”
Several respondents turn to the context of local programs to

explain the field’s loose terminology. Stuart Selber notes “I love the theory

talk, but I think the different uses are more strategic than anything: people
find language for their local context that allows them to claim a special
campus expertise.” Rob Irish describes how our terminology might

function strategically not only as a form of marketing to students, but also
on behalf of a larger profession:

Could it be that “professional” is a wish label to elevate our
courses into the realm of desireable [sic] to students who are
skeptical? Perhaps, the label is to persuade students that
this course could lead to employment (unlike say, “creative
writing” or “literature”). That is, this is for “college educated
workers” who also want a job (or should I say, employment,
or a profession—latinized euphemisms for good Old
Engish [sic] work). This is not to say that we are misleading
students, only that we are employing the power of language
to simultaneously compose the profession and elevate its
status.

And Stephen A. Bernhardt likewise emphasizes a strategic function,

noting that “sometimes terms are useful because loose. It is often useful to
distinguish professionals who write from professional writers”
(“Professional”).

In all, the broad range (and tangential nature) of this discussion

suggests that the question at its origin is a deceptively hard one to answer.
Defining technical communication—even just in defining the ways it
might stand distinct from “professional” writing or “professional”
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communication—is a particularly thorny undertaking, as it necessarily

touches on a number of lingering disciplinary, professional, and political
issues. Calls to draw up lists of “core competencies,” to certify

practitioners, and to professionalize the field are seemingly permanent

features of technical communication scholarship and commentary (see

Turner and Rainey; Savage, “Process”; Savage and Kynell-Hunt). Given

the lack of consensus among researchers, practitioners, and teachers about
what constitutes the ideal course of professional preparation for technical
communicators, an axiomatic, universally held definition of a “technical
communication program” is unlikely to emerge soon. In addition, as

reported in in-depth curricular studies, technical communication curricula

are wildly disparate at both the certificate and undergraduate levels. As far

as we can tell, there is no such thing as a “core” or “standard” curriculum in
technical communication (Nugent, “Looking”; Harner and Rich). So even
efforts to empirically derive a working definition of a “technical
communication program” are likely to be met with frustration.

The question of defining our field will doubtlessly receive further

study—not just in the form of program research but also in the form of

debate about the more abstract issues of what “counts” professionally and

disciplinarily as technical communication. While I return to this issue and

offer some commentary of my own in the final chapter, I concede here that
to definitively settle the questions surrounding the identity of technical

communication lies well beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, my

method requires that I provide at least provisional answers to these thorny
questions, if only for the purpose of determining the survey sample. So,
•

given the deficiencies in the major program directories and the
need to actively supplement them through web searches;
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•

given that a significant number of programs expressly in

“professional writing” are clearly not intended to prepare

students for careers in technical communication or related
lines;
•

given the apparent consensus among teacher/scholars that
meaningful differences do exist between “technical” and
“professional” programs;

•

given the lack of consensus on what those differences might
specifically be; and

•

given that examining individual program curricula to assess
their status as a “technical communication” program or

otherwise would be untenable—not only because such an

undertaking would exceed the scope of the current study, but
because it would also imply that established criteria exist for
making such a determination—;

I had to determine a systematic means of my own for identifying the

relevant programs to survey. For this, I elected to rely on program names to
determine their inclusion in this study. Specifically, I restricted my sample
to programs in the comprehensive directory offering at least one

baccalaureate degree, baccalaureate concentration, certificate, or graduate
degree having the word “technical” in its title (such as “technical
communication,” “technical writing,” “technical and business

communication,” etc.). That is, “professional” degrees and certificates were

excluded from my sample except in cases where the program also offered a
“technical” degree or certificate. Of the 172 programs listed in the
comprehensive directory of programs, 141 met this qualification.

My final step in determining the sample was to restrict the survey

only to those programs offering baccalaureates or certificates. That is, since
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this study is intended to provide a comparison between baccalaureate and
certificate programs, I did not want to survey programs offering only, say,

an associate’s degree, an undergraduate minor, or graduate degrees. Of the
141 remaining programs in my sample, 27 offered no apparent certificate,
baccalaureate degree, concentration of any kind, leaving 114 programs in

the final sample. These 114 programs comprising the sample are noted in
Appendix A.

The Survey Instrument

With the sample selected, I then worked to compose and execute

the survey. The survey instrument I composed is four pages long, contains
14 questions, and asks questions soliciting 40 pieces of data about

applicable certificate or baccalaureate programs (see appendix B for a
facsimile of the survey). I estimated it would take a knowledgeable

program administrator approximately 15 minutes to complete. On page

one of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s institution: its status
as public or private, its size, the department or academic unit containing

the program, the types of professional or technical communication/writing
degrees offered by the department or academic unit, and the types of
degrees (of all kinds) offered by the department or academic unit.

On page two of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s

professional or technical communication/writing baccalaureate degree or

baccalaureate concentration, if offered. The data I sought include: the year

the program conferred its first baccalaureate, the current enrollment in the

baccalaureate program, the number of degrees conferred in the 2006–2007
academic year, the total number of degrees conferred in the lifetime of the

program, the total number of courses required for program completion, the
number of hours per week that courses in the baccalaureate program

typically meet for, the number of weeks in a term of study, the number of
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terms required for program completion, the portion of the degree that can
be earned online, and whether an internship is required for program
completion.

On page three of the survey, I ask questions about the program’s

professional or technical communication/writing certificate, if offered, and
these questions parallel the questions appearing on page two. The data I
sought include: the year the program conferred its first certificate, the

current enrollment in the certificate program, the number of certificates

conferred in the 2006–2007 academic year, the total number of certificates
conferred in the lifetime of the program, the total number of courses

required for program completion, the number of hours per week that

courses in the certificate program typically meet for, the number of weeks
in a term of study, the number of terms required for program completion,
the portion of the certificates that can be earned online, and whether an
internship is required for certificate completion. In addition, I asked
whether enrollment in some other program (such as a baccalaureate
program) was required for certificate enrollment.

On page four of the survey, I ask questions about instructors in the

department or academic unit housing the professional or technical

communication/writing baccalaureate or certificate. The data I sought
include: the total number of instructors teaching in the department or
academic unit (including full-time, part-time, faculty, adjunct, and

graduate students, regardless of their specialization); the number of

graduate student teaching in the department or academic unit; the number
of tenure-track instructors teaching in the department or academic unit;
the number of instructors regularly teaching technical communication
courses, the number of instructors regularly teaching technical

communication courses holding a degree expressly in the disciplines of
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•
•
•
•

technical communication,
technical writing,

business writing, or

professional writing;

the specializations of instructors regularly teaching technical

communication courses that don’t hold the above-listed degrees; and, of
instructors regularly teaching technical communication courses, the
number that
•
•
•
•
•
•

have industry or professional experience,

hold a bachelor’s degree as their highest degree earned,
hold a master’s degree as their highest degree earned,
hold a doctorate as their highest degree earned,
are graduate students, and

hold tenure-track positions.

After composing, laying out, and duplicating the survey, on 3 April

2008 I mailed the survey to the 114 selected programs along with a cover

letter explaining the research (see Appendix C for a facsimile of the letter)
and a prepaid-postage return mailer. On 12 May 2008, I sent reminder

postcards (reproduced in Appendix D) to the 80 programs who had not

yet responded by that date. On 18 June 2008, I sent new duplicate surveys
and cover letters (again with a prepaid-postage return mailer) to the 73

programs who had not yet responded by that date. By 15 September 2008,
I received a total of 59 completed surveys—a response rate of 52%. In the

following chapter, I discuss the results and conclusions from these surveys,
and I conclude this work by presenting some theorization of technical
communication certificate programs most broadly.
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Chapter 5:
Results and Conclusions
In this chapter, I present the results of this study in the form of

descriptive statistics about technical communication certificate programs
and I conclude by discussing what these results might signify, both

practically and theoretically, for our understanding of certificates. But first,
in keeping with the feminist-sophistic methodology I articulated in

chapters 2 and 3, I make a brief, reflexive digression to resolve a few
remaining methodological issues.

Feminist-Sophistic Methodology and the “God-Trick”

As I describe in chapter 3, in my attempt to enact a feminist-

sophistic methodology I eschew the “god-trick” in the rhetorical

performance of this study. I describe three major rhetorical techniques I
employ toward this end: remaining present in the text, remaining

grounded in a practical disciplinary context, and remaining aware of the
inherent rhetoricity of scholarship. So far I have attempted to remain

present in the text both grammatically and ethically through my use of the
active voice and personal pronouns. I have also attempted to remain

grounded in a practical disciplinary context by identifying my audience

and framing the study as a response to conversations within the academic
field of technical communication. And I have attempted to self-

consciously foreground the rhetoricity of this work by identifying it as a
persuasive act that I intend to accomplish a particular purpose, with a
particular audience, within a particular context.

According to the generic conventions of empirical research,

however, this is the point in the study where—after the background,

methodology, and methods have been displayed—the major findings are
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revealed in the form of results and conclusions. At this point, I believe, I

am faced most directly with the dilemma I discuss at the outset of chapter
2: how do I make broad, persuasive claims about certificate programs

nationwide while resisting the foundationalizing impulses of a traditional
methodology? Convention holds that this portion of the study should
focus almost exclusively on the “objects” of research and put forward
broadly aggregative results and summative conclusions about those

“objects.” Such results and conclusions are typically composed in the

declarative mood with an almost godlike authorial voice, a rhetorical form
that, like the passive voice, represents an evasion of grammatical and

ethical agency. The god-trick, it would seem, looms large over this chapter,
deeply encoded within the empirical research genre.

What alternative rhetorical form could this chapter take to remain

consistent with a feminist-sophistic methodology? How can I present
knowledge that actually claims to say something about certificate

programs—knowledge with persuasive effect and distinct practical

application, but without the pretense and stylistic artifice of objective
Truth? One possible approach would be for me to use the sophistic

rhetorical techniques of antithesis, parataxis, dissoi logoi, and paradoxologia

to present multiple, differing—even contradictory—conclusions from the
data I generate. Such an approach would counter the prevalent,

foundationalist notions of non-contradiction and objectivity, and would
work against the god-trick as a feature of the empirical research genre.
However, this approach also presents its own unique problems. In its
almost Derridian insistence that texts must necessarily work against

themselves—even to the end of their own political incapacitation—this

approach might also subvert the possibility for making practical meaning
in the first place. Further, such an approach could serve to keep my

positionality and mediate role as a rhetor-researcher obscured: the various
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conclusions that I presented under such an approach, for instance, would
still be of my own devising, finite in number, and persuasive in intent.

Instead, I will take an approach that perhaps allows me to more

productively address both sides of this “god-trick” dilemma. As I describe

in chapter 2, a feminist-sophistic methodology retains a optimism toward
the possibility of exercising political agency and making meaning. In that
chapter I cite Haraway’s invocation of the coyote-trickster, a figure who
“suggests our situation when we give up mastery but keep searching for
fidelity, knowing all the while we will be hoodwinked” (Simians 199). I

also cite Jasper Neel’s parallel commentary that, “In contrast to Derrida

[…] the sophists allow themselves to be persuaded by an argument, while
never forgetting the inadequate, deceitful foundation that enabled the

argument” (207). Consistent with these critical, yet optimistic epistemic
perspectives, I will assert the knowledge of this study in a direct and

declarative rhetorical style largely consistent with the empirical research

genre. However, in attempt to contravene the looming god-trick, I will also
foreground some of the wily and deceptive strategies that undergird my
claims to knowledge in this study.

This approach is suggested by Scott Consigny’s characterization of

Gorgias’ “parodic” style: a performative style in which the ancient rhetor

deliberately draws attention to both the conventions and the rhetoricity of
localized discourses. As Consigny describes, Gorgias’ use of this style is a
reflection of his sophistic epistemology:

by displaying the rhetoricity of every text, he shows his
audience that all arguments, including his own, are
contingent, situated fabrications that are “true” only insofar
as they are endorsed by specific audiences. Gorgias’
objective is not to transmit objective truth or to inculcate
universal moral principles, but to encourage people to
become engaged in the agons of their culture. (Gorgias 30–
1)
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By displaying the rhetoricity of the present text in a similar fashion, I

believe that I both avoid the “Pyrrhonian skepticism” of deconstruction
(Bizzell) and undermine the foundationalizing rhetorical ploys of
traditional scientific scholarship.10 Toward both of these ends, I

acknowledge the following as rhetorical strategies in my accounts of
technical communication programs:
•

I use the declarative mood to lend a sense of certainty and
unassailability to my claims. This linguistic feature serves

rhetorically to obscure my agency as a rhetor-researcher, to

erase the appearance of ambiguity from my knowledge claims,
and to draw the audience’s attention away not only from my
active role in the construction of this text, but also from the
very notion that this text was constructed to begin with.
•

I am selective of what results and conclusions I present from
this research. I don’t present the full range of possible

outcomes and interpretations from this study. Rather, I compile
a finite number of results and conclusions that I think are

rhetorically feasible to assert and that I assume are significant.
What counts as “feasible” or “significant,” of course, is

For a contrasting perspective, see Michelle Ballif’s Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman
with the Rhetorical Figure (182–6). As a scholar closer to the deconstructive school than
myself, I suspect that Ballif might fault the sort of middle-ground, or neopragmatic,
stance that I describe here. To Ballif, such a stance “is not sophistic enough” (183) and
serves “once again (in the name of antifoundationalism) to stabilize language” (182). Such
a stance “emanates from a rhetorical subject who controls language who can chose to
abuse it or not—or to abuse others via its power” (183). Although Ballif grants that such
a position is “released from ontological foundations, metaphysical presumptions and
truth,” it is nonetheless bound by its “dependence on techne,” and as such, “serves to
maintain the boundaries and limits of a particular discourse and is motivated by the desire
of the ‘we’ to colonize every ‘they.’” (183).
10
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informed by my subject position and the particular audience(s),
purpose(s), and context(s) that this study speaks to.
•

I structure my presentation of information with the intent to

close off alternative interpretations. For instance, I often first
present a summative statement or conclusion, followed by a
recitation of the data from the study that I believe supports

that conclusion (again, in the declarative mood). Ordering my
argument in this way engages my audience enthymematically
by encouraging them to think through the connections

between the conclusion and the premises on their own. But

stating the conclusion first can be seen as an attempt on my

part to attain control over the audience’s likely interpretation of
the data and to forestall the possibility of my audience arriving
at alternative conclusions.
•

I use verb tense to perform a sort of “epistemic elision”

between the particular and the general. This survey offers a
snapshot of descriptive statistics about technical

communication programs in the context of 2008. Despite the

fact that the survey is situated in the past, however, the results
and conclusions that follow are largely in the present tense.

This works rhetorically to obscure the circumstantiality—and

to affirm the universality—of my results and conclusions. As I

explore in chapter 3, the artful use of verb tense in this way can
give knowledge the seductive appearance of timelessness.
•

I rely on categories of my own construction to give suasive

power to information. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the results of

sorting information into discrete categories. Although I was
systematic in performing these categorizations, devising the
categories themselves was an iterative and ad hoc process of
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looking at the survey results and identifying areas of

commonality and difference. This process was informed not
only by my reading of similar research (for example, Harner

and Rich) but also by my particular, situated understanding of

disciplinary politics. Establishing discrete categories in this way
(a rhetorical tactic that summons back to Aristotle) lends the
appearance of priority and transcendence to intellectual

constructs that are, at best, kairotic and heuristic. Alternative
and equally meaningful categories are, of course, possible.
•

I use visual design to establish a sense of credibility. For

instance, the tidy tables of data that follow bear no resemblance
to the relatively casual Microsoft Excel spreadsheets that the
data came from or even to the pile of handwritten surveys

sitting on my desk. My careful and hygienic visual presentation
of the data works to establish my ethos as a careful researcher.
Similarly, the overall visual layout of these pages works to
establish the ethos of a staid, scholarly monograph. My

consistent use of only one serif font and the general absence of
non-textual visual features in this document, for instance, are
my attempts to tap into a long visual tradition of alphabeticcentric scholarship.

This isn’t, of course, a catalog of all the rhetorical strategies

employed in this chapter, and these strategies certainly aren’t unique to the
present study. But by foregrounding the rhetoricity of this work in such a

self-reflexive and confessional way—even at the risk of ultimately reducing
its suasive power—I hope to engage in the creation of positive, usable
knowledge while still making apparent my mediate role as a rhetor-

researcher. My intent here is not to undermine this study, or, again, to

reveal it as a load of opportunistic, untethered blather. Rather, by laying
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bare some of the rhetorical machinations of this study, my intent is to draw
attention to the rhetorical machinations—that is, the “trickery” and

“deception”—at the heart of all knowledge claims. In this way, the more
fully present and accountable “coyote tricks” of a feminist-sophistic

epistemology come to replace the largely invisible and coercive “god-

tricks” of our received epistemologies. As I articulate in chapter 3, such a

feminist-sophistic epistemology holds promise as both a more ethical and
rigorous means of knowledge production.

Results

In preparing the data for analysis, I transcribed the 59 returned

surveys into a Microsoft Access database. As I performed this

transcription, I obeyed two conventions. First, I did not record the
responses to questions left blank, answered “N/A,” or answered

“unknown.” Second, when answering questions soliciting a numeric
answer (such as the total number of instructors in a program), some

respondents provided an estimated range instead of a single number. In
these cases, I recorded the midpoint of the range. For instance, if a

respondent answered “12–14,” I recorded “13.” After transcribing the

surveys, I moved the data into an Excel spreadsheet for calculation and
analysis. I discuss the results in detail in the following sections.
Programmatic Locations

In table 1, I classify responding programs into major categories

according to the name of their department or academic unit. According to
this breakdown, 59% of programs offering a baccalaureate degree are
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housed in departments of language and literature or English.11 By

comparison, 43% of programs offering a certificate are housed in such
departments, suggesting that certificates enjoy relative freedom from
technical communication’s traditional academic home of English. In

addition, certificates also show up in a greater diversity of programmatic
locations, including those outside of traditional academic departments.
The programs that I classified as “other” (each of which offer only

certificates) belong to the following departments or academic units:
•
•
•
•
•

College of Extended and International Education,
Community Education and Training,

Business and Professional Development,
Continuing Studies, and

Business and Management.

See also Harner and Rich’s 2005 study, “Trends in Undergraduate Curriculum in
Scientific and Technical Communication Programs.” Of the 80 programs they study,
61% belong to departments of English (214).
11
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Table 1. Department or academic unit for all responding programs, for
programs offering a bachelor’s (or concentration), and for programs
offering a certificate.

Department or unit

n

English/Language and Lit.
Technical Communication
Communication
Writing
Other

%

Baccalaureate
n

%

Certificate
n

%

32

55

22

59

15

43

4

7

3

8

2

6

9
5

Humanities

All

3
5

Total: 58

16

9
5
9

100

7
3
3
0

37

19

8
8
0

100

8

23

2

6

3
5

35

9
1
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Age and Size of Programs

The following are the major results that I developed regarding the

age and size of responding programs, as reported in questions 6a–d and
7a–d of the survey:
•

Certificate programs in technical communication—while certainly
an established phenomenon—are newer relative to baccalaureate
degree programs. The average age of baccalaureate programs, in
2008, was 18 years, with programs ranging in age from 0 to 50

years (SD = 11.1). The average reported age of certificate programs
was 14.3 years, with programs ranging in age from 1 to 28 years
(SD = 8.3).
•

Program sizes vary widely, but baccalaureate programs have larger
enrollments than certificate programs. Baccalaureate programs

reported an average of 40.4 enrolled students at the time of the

survey, and ranged from 2 to 250 students (SD = 45.0). Certificate
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programs reported an average of 26.2 enrolled students, and ranged
from 0 to 370 students (SD = 54.8).
•

Baccalaureate programs outpace certificates in graduating students.
Responding baccalaureate programs conferred an average of 10.4

baccalaureate degrees during the course of the 2006–07 academic
year (SD = 8.30). During the same year, certificate programs

conferred an average of 9.0 certificates (SD = 8.97). Responding

programs conferred a lifetime total of 5,597 baccalaureate degrees
over 660 baccalaureate program-years—a historical average of 8.5
degrees awarded per year per program. They also conferred a

lifetime total of 2,935 certificates over 431 certificate program-

years—a historical average of 6.8 certificates awarded per year per
program.

Degree and Certificate Requirements

The following are the major results that I developed regarding

degree and certificate requirements, as reported in the multipart questions
6 and 7:
•

Most certificates (86%, n = 34) can be earned independently of any
other degree, and do not require students to be concurrently
enrolled in some other degree program.

•

The average certificate requires roughly one-fourth the coursework

of the average baccalaureate degree. Baccalaureate programs require
an average of 29.3 courses (both within and without the

department) for program completion, while certificates require an

average of 7.6 courses (SD = 4.34). Expressed in terms of semester
hours, baccalaureate programs require an average of 91.1 semester
hours (SD = 50.9), while certificates require an average of 25.5
semester hours (SD = 14.5).
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•

Certificates are slower paced than baccalaureates. The average

anticipated time to completion for certificates is about half that of

baccalaureate degrees, despite the fact that certificates only require
around one-fourth the coursework. When asked how much time
students are anticipated to spend completing their program,

respondents indicated an average of 6.8 terms for baccalaureate
degrees (SD = 2.52) and 3.3 terms for certificates (SD = 1.45).
Expressed in weeks of instruction, respondents anticipate on

average 99 weeks for baccalaureate degree completion (SD = 33.2)
and 48 weeks for certificate completion (SD = 23.5).
•

While they are just as likely as baccalaureate programs to offer at

least some course content online, certificates are much more likely

to be obtainable entirely online. Nearly two-thirds of baccalaureate
degrees (66%, n = 35) offer some online courses, as do an equal

portion of certificate programs (66%, n = 35). However, only 6% of
baccalaureate degree programs can be completed entirely online
(n = 35), while 31% of certificate programs can (n = 35).
•

Baccalaureate programs are much more likely to require an

internship than certificate programs are. Fifty-eight percent of
baccalaureate programs require an internship for program

completion (n = 33), while only 17% of certificate programs do (n =
35).

Instructor Degrees and Professional Status

The following are the major results I developed concerning the

degrees and professional status of instructors who regularly teach technical
communication, as reported in questions 11, 12, and 14a–f (see table 2):
•

Few technical communication instructors hold degrees specifically
in the disciplines of technical communication, technical writing,
business writing, or professional writing. About one in three

106

instructors in all responding programs can claim such academic
preparation.12 In programs offering a certificate and only a
certificate, this ratio falls to one in five.
•

Certificate program instructors have less professional status.

Although they possess more industry and professional experience,

certificate program instructors hold fewer academic credentials and
are less likely to be on the tenure track. More specifically, if a

program offers a certificate, compared to instructors in programs
offering a baccalaureate degree or concentration its technical
communication instructors are:

o about one and one-half times as likely to have industry or
professional experience,

o just as likely to have a degree specifically in the disciplines
of technical communication, technical writing, business
writing, or professional writing;

o three-fourths as likely to have a doctorate; and

o four-fifths as likely to hold a tenure-track position.

•

Technical communication instructors in programs that offer a

certificate and only a certificate have even less professional status.
That is, such instructors, relative to the instructors in programs
offering a baccalaureate degree or concentration, are:

This is consistent with data on hiring reported in Carolyn Rude and Kelli Cargile
Cook’s study “The Academic Job Market in Technical Communication, 2002–2003.” In
that year, “While PhDs in technical or professional communication were the most
commonly hired, they filled fewer than one-third (29%) of the primary positions that
advertised for someone with their specialty” (61). Rude and Cook attribute this to the
fact that “current doctoral programs cannot graduate sufficient doctorates to fill the
market’s need,” as well as the lack of exclusive demand for technical communication
specialists (61).
12
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o about one and two-thirds times as likely to have industry or
professional experience,

o two-thirds as likely to have a degree specifically in the

disciplines of technical communication, technical writing,
business writing, or professional writing;

o three-fifths as likely to have a doctorate; and

o three-fifths as likely to hold a tenure-track position.
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Qualification

Industry/professional experience

Degree expressly in tech. comm.

Master’s as highest earned

Doctorate as highest earned

Currently a graduate student

Hold a tenure-track position

All tech. comm. instructors

Survey

14a

12

14c

14d

14e

14f

11

598

236

118

283

254

178

381

n

100

39

20

47

42

30

64

%

In all programs

322

112

47

126

155

101

228

n

35

14

39

48

31

71

100

%

A certificate

81

19

0

19

35

17

67

n

100

23

0

23

43

21

83

%

Only a certificate

In programs offering:

and by program offering. The leftmost column lists the applicable survey question.

452

197

118

237

182

139

226

n

109

100

44

26

52

40

31

50

%

A bachelor’s

Table 2. The number of technical communication instructors holding various qualifications, in all surveyed programs

Academic Specializations of Instructors

In question 13, I asked participants about the academic

specializations of program instructors who regularly teach technical

communication courses in their program, but who do not hold degrees

expressly in technical communication, technical writing, business writing,

or professional writing. Their responses, which I categorized by major type,
are listed in table 3. Across all programs, instructors who regularly teach

technical communication courses demonstrate a diverse range of academic
specializations. Their most commonly listed specializations, however, are

the English-related fields of composition and rhetoric, literary studies, and
English (general or unspecified). The 19 responses comprising the “other”
category of specializations are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Design

Engineering

Film/Media Studies

Graphic Arts/Graphic Design (2)
Information Design

Instructional Design
Journalism (2)
Law

Liberal Arts

Management

Nuclear Engineering
Philosophy

Psychology

Science and Technology Studies (2)
Systems Engineering
Web Design
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Table 3. Reported specializations of instructors who regularly teach

technical communication, but who do not have a degree specifically in the

disciplines of technical communication, technical writing, business writing,
or professional writing.

Specialization

Responses

Composition and Rhetoric

30

English (general or unspecified)

16

Literary Studies
Education

Communication
Linguistics

Creative Writing
Other

29
5
5
4
3

19

Summary of Results

In all, compared to baccalaureate programs, certificate programs in

technical communication:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

are less likely to be housed within departments of English;
are younger;

are smaller in enrollment;
graduate fewer students;

are more likely to be earnable completely online;
are much less likely to require an internship;

have instructors with more industry experience;

have fewer instructors holding technical communication–
specific degrees;

•
•

have fewer instructors on the tenure track; and

have instructors with fewer academic credentials overall.
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As rules of thumb, technical communication certificates can be earned

independently of any other degree, and they require about one-fourth the
coursework of a baccalaureate but take half the time to complete.

Regardless of whether their program offers a certificate or a baccalaureate,
only one in three technical communication instructors hold a degree

specifically in technical communication, technical writing, professional

writing, and business writing. However, if a program offers a certificate
and only a certificate, this ratio drops to one in five.

Conclusions

As I noted in the introduction, in my 2003 study of certificate

programs, “Certificate Programs in Technical Communication: Looking
Closer, through Sophistic Eyes,” I found that certificate programs enjoy
great flexibility at both the curricular and programmatic levels. In that
study, I performed an examination of certificate program curricula

nationwide and concluded that such programs “vary wildly,” are “disparate
and wide-ranging,” and that “no core curriculum can be said to exist

among them.” In a survey I conducted for that study, I also found that

certificate programs demonstrate a strong concern for the needs of local

industry (as compared, say, to broader professional standards). I found that
a majority of programs make use of an industry advisory board, recruit
from local industry, and/or employ some other means of gathering

feedback from local industry. As I concluded, the curricular flexibility and
the local orientation of certificates

are consistent with a conception of technical
communication as a postmodern profession in a market
where no standard, universally-required skill set has
emerged—whether from the collective needs of industry or
as a result of professionalizing gestures from elsewhere.

112

I believe that the present study further corroborates this depiction of

certificates as a flexible and indeterminate course of preparation for a field
whose contours remain—likewise—flexible and indeterminate.

In general, technical communication certificate programs are not as

established as baccalaureate programs are (as indicated by program age,

enrollments, and graduation rates). Compared to baccalaureates, certificate
program instructors have less professional status in the form of academic
credentials, access to the tenure track, and technical communication–

specific degrees. And since certificate programs are much less likely to

require an internship for program completion, their curricula appear to

offer less by way of experiential learning (see Little “Technical”). At first
glance, then, it is tempting to declare certificates to be relatively

impoverished on grounds of their curricula, the professional status of their
instructors, and their “establishedness” as programs.

However, certificates also show signs of being less tradition-bound

than baccalaureate degrees. That is, certificate programs are less tied to the
brick-and-mortar university (in that they are more likely to be earnable
online) and they are less tied to the traditional departmental home of
English (in that they are more likely to fall into a diverse range of

programmatic locations outside of English). In addition, instructors in

certificate programs are much more likely to have industry or professional

experience than instructors in baccalaureate programs—while they cannot
claim the same level of academic preparation as baccalaureate instructors,
they can claim more practical, non-academic experience. I believe that

these results support the notion that certificates are more flexible and less
academically oriented than their baccalaureate counterparts.

Certificate programs’ precise impact on the status of technical

communication as a profession and a discipline remains uncertain. Given

that certificate programs are less established and have instructors with less
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professional status, certificates may—at least on the academic side—serve
to undermine efforts to achieve material security for those in the field.
However, this study also suggests a number of other, more telling

conclusions about the status of the field and its instructors. Across all

programs, fewer than one in three instructors of technical communication
hold degrees in the disciplines of technical communication, technical

writing, business writing, or professional writing. Of those instructors not
holding technical communication–specific degrees, their most commonly

listed specializations are in English-related areas. Some three out of every
five baccalaureate programs are housed within departments of English, as
are about two out of every five certificate programs.13

While these results are hardly surprising, they do serve as an

immediate confirmation and reminder that technical communication—at

least as reflected in the staffing and location of academic programs—is far
from achieving disciplinary autonomy and professionalization. Technical
communication’s lack of practical distinction from English studies

suggests that it has yet to attain many of what Gerald J. Savage enumerates
as the defining features of a modernist profession (“Process”; “Tricksters”
169), particularly the features of market closure, self-regulation, and a

formalized body of knowledge. Beyond the present survey, of course, there
are other signs that the goal of modernist professionalization remains
unrealized: the lack of standard—or even consistent—curricula for
certificates and baccalaureate degrees (Harner and Rich; Nugent,
“Looking”); the failure to establish certification for instructors or

I don’t mean here to join the fray concerning English departments’ status as the
predominant scholarly home for technical communication (see Dragga), nor do I intend
to speak to the larger disciplinary-political shifts occurring in English studies (see
Ostergaard et al.). Rather, I intend for these results to speak only to the current status of
the projects of professionalization and discipline formation within technical
communication.
13
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practitioners (Turner and Rainey); and even the broad range of names that
are used for our academic programs, scholarly journals, and the field itself

(see chapter 4). In light of the much larger hurdles still facing the projects
of professionalization and disciplinary legitimization, I suggest that the

particular anxieties surrounding certificate programs are, at least for the
time being, misplaced. Particularly as certificate programs do not show

signs of surpassing baccalaureate programs in enrollments or graduation
rates, there likely remain more productive battles to wage in technical

communication’s war for professional and disciplinary status (to use a
fraught, but possibly apt, metaphor).

Certificates may, in fact, be poised to advance the status of

technical communication by encouraging the growth of academic

programs. Because of the reduced barriers to setting up new certificates

compared to other types of programs (Little, “Designing” 275), certificates
could help bring a certain strength in numbers to technical

communication, achieving at least one important measure of disciplinary
and professional standing: ubiquity. Further, thoughtfully designed

certificates could play a role in ensuring that technical communication’s

growth remains healthy. As Robert R. Johnson suggests, one strategy for
long-term sustainability

is for programs to become more focussed and specialized.
Each program, in other words, could have distinct and
recognizable purposes beyond the pail of general technical
communication. In short, we could consider creating
programs that present “pockets of specialties”: programs
where students can go to focus on strong and well
developed areas of curriculum and scholarship that will be
fruitful for students and faculty alike. (“Deeply” 117)

Because of their flexibility and concern for local needs (Little, “Designing”
275; Nugent, “Looking”), certificates could be ideally positioned to help

establish these sorts of strategic programs. For example, Bowling Green
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State University and the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee have each

recently inaugurated certificates with a special emphasis on international

technical communication, and the University of Washington Educational
Outreach currently offers a user-centered design certificate. These

existence of these programs suggests that certificates are flexible enough to
accommodate emerging issues in the field and are able to offer
specializations in the way that Johnson advocates.

I should note, though, that the possibilities I sketch here remain

largely speculative. More in-depth research is called for—research on the

students, the graduates, the individual contexts, and the administration of
certificate programs, both qualitative and quantitative—in order to more
accurately gauge certificates’ impact on the field. However, in the next
section, I suggest how certificates may speak in a more potent and

theoretical way to our current professional and scholarly conversations

about the disciplinary and professional status of technical communication.
As I find, neosophistic theory may suggest a way to step outside of these
conversations entirely as they are currently framed.

Discussion and Theoretical Implications

I would like to conclude this chapter by reiterating and expanding

on a framework for theorizing the technical communication certificate

program that I first articulated in my earlier study (“Looking”). As Gerald
J. Savage demonstrates in his chapter “Tricksters, Fools, and Sophists:

Technical Communication as Postmodern Rhetoric,” the sophist provides
a compelling model for the identity of the technical communicator:
[T]he work of technical writing seems to be consistent with
a sophistic practice in which knowledge is always
contingent, in which rhetorical purpose must be reconciled
to the needs of a particular audience at a particular time
and place. Technical writing as we find it today has
emerged in relation to particular economic, political, and
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technological circumstances which combine in complex and
contradictory ways that make the work our practitioners do
both useful and disruptive, both materially rewarding and
risky […] Yet these circumstances present us with the
strongest argument for accepting the apparently weak role
of the non-expert, unrecognized, incompletely
professionalized, uncertified, hard to define sophisttechnical communicator. (189)

By conceiving of technical communication as a sophistic profession, its

members become “politically and socially engaged communicators who

recognize the inevitability of their texts as socially transformative” (171).
Its members also embrace their status as “liminal subjects,” “occupying

marginal zones between the subject matter expert and the lay audience,
trading status both in the corporation and in larger society for relative

freedom to travel across the boundaries of these social-cultural domains”
(180).

Here Savage is drawing on the concept of the “liminal subject,” as

characterized in the work of Joseph Jeyaraj. In his 2004 article “Liminality
and Othering: The Issue of Rhetorical Authority in Technical Discourse”
Jeyaraj depicts liminal spaces and subjects as such:

Liminal spaces are different from normal spaces located
within particular discourses because of their flexibility and
openness. Well-established discourse communities have
clearly developed discursive patters, social structures, mores,
and conventions. […] However, people in liminal positions
[…] because they are not located firmly within the
discursive patterns of a community, have more
opportunities to form practices that transgress some of
those discursive patters. (16)

I contend that the certificate program in technical communication can be
theorized as occupying a liminal zone: a particularly sophistic space
between academy and industry, theory and practice, education and
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training, local and universal. Just as sophism concentrates on the individual
locations and contexts of knowledge production at the expense of

“predictive, generalizing models” (Savage, “Tricksters” 186), certificate
programs often situate themselves to meet the practical needs of local

industry (Little, “Designing” 278, Nugent, “Looking”). Just as sophism

threatens the modernist distinction between theory and practice (Leff 24;

J. Scott 193), the situation of the certificate program between academy and
industry lends it the potential to collapse theory and practice into new
conceptions of professional identity. Certificate programs, I assert, are

theoretically consistent with—and are situated to support the work of—
technical communication as a sophistic profession.

In Savage’s characterization of technical communication as

sophistic, the field avoids the impulse to achieve market closure and the
vestments of a modernist profession. In exchange for giving up a

determinate set of professional knowledges—not to mention their

attendant status and security—the field wins the ability to remain flexible
in the face of an ever-changing postindustrial workplace (“Tricksters,”
188–9). To Savage, such flexibility is a source of strength for technical
communication, particularly in a world “in which no position can be

counted on to last, in which change seems to rule and the ability to adapt
to change is most valued” (189). As I find, certificate programs

demonstrate a number of decidedly sophistic traits that are consistent with
Savage’s characterization.

As John Poulakos notes in his volume Sophistical Rhetoric in

Classical Greece, the ancient, traveling sophists were compelled in their
practice to “adjust themselves to different laws and institutions,

accommodate a variety of students, and tailor their messages to suit the
sensibilities and tastes of their diverse audiences” (25; see also Savage,
“Tricksters” 187). Similarly, I find in my 2003 study that certificate
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programs demonstrate diverse and flexible curricula that are informed by
the needs of local industry. The ancient sophists also “lived and worked

more according to the circumstances they encountered and less according
to established custom or principle” (Poulakos, Sophistical 25; see also

Savage, “Tricksters” 186). Similarly, I find in the present study that, relative
to baccalaureate programs, certificates are less established and traditionbound. Finally, the ancient sophists, while quite successful in their own

right, were deprived of many traditional forms of status in ancient Greece
(Savage, “Tricksters” 186). Similarly, I find that certificate program

instructors have less status in the form of academic preparation and

tenure-track appointments. The certificate in technical communication is,
I conclude, a particularly sophistic credential for a particularly sophistic
field.

Of course, sophistic theory offers more than just descriptive

frameworks: I believe that it also offers important prescriptions for the
successful design and implementation of certificate programs. Platonic

curricula—which sophistic curricula can be said to be articulated against—
would hold that the practices of technical communication are entirely

reducible to formalizable first principles, and therefore such curricula only
demand sufficient classroom time to facilitate the “transfer” of formalized
knowledge from teacher to student. These curricula are what a number of

recent commentators have in mind when they call for the drafting of fixed
lists of “core competencies” and a “codified body of knowledge” for the
field of technical communication (see Turner and Rainey; Rainey,

“Approaches”). In contrast to such curricula, a thoroughly sophistic

curriculum recognizes that the practice of technical communication is

contingent, localized, and social, and therefore it makes space beyond the
classroom for students to develop appropriate professional capacities in
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context. A sophistic curriculum, in other words, demands social
engagement.

As Jarratt notes in Rereading the Sophists, “the sophists could be

termed the first public intellectuals in a democracy” (98). Sophism is, by its
nature, publicly accountable and “immersed in the adjudication of

immediate cultural concerns” (Crowley 318), an attribute that Savage also

foregrounds in his characterization of the sophist technical communicator
(“Tricksters” 171). In his 1995 article “Sophistic Ethics in the Technical

Writing Classroom: Teaching Nomos, Deliberation, and Action,” J. Blake
Scott calls for the incorporation of sophistic ethics into technical
communication pedagogy:

We can begin by teaching technical writing as praxis or
social action, as others have proposed. A praxis pedagogy
approaches writing as social enculturation […] We should
help our students problematize their enculturation and roles
as writers in different communities by addressing issues of
politics and power. (195)

Internships, Scott notes, are a particularly effective means “to teach ethical
enculturation,” as are orientation videos, sample texts, guest speakers,

participation in “virtual businesses” and digital communities, and the use

of case studies (196). Although I find in my earlier study that certificates

are socially engaged insofar as they are committed to the interests of local

industry, the present study suggests that fewer than two in five certificates
require an internship for program completion. Given that certificates are
also slower-paced than baccalaureate degrees, this discrepancy cannot be
attributed solely to lack of time or curricular space. With regards to
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internships, it appears that certificate programs need to do more to prepare
students for their social roles in a sophistic profession.14

Another strategy that neosophistic theory recommends for

program design is the incorporation of reflexive professional development.
As J. Blake Scott notes, “perhaps the most important kind of deliberation
to the sophists […] was inner deliberation through the internalization of
logos. […] The sophists’ students entered dialogues with themselves in

order to master logos and develop their own ethical codes” (192–3). When
seen as a sophistic profession, the qualification of a technical

communicator is not a discrete skill set that he or she possesses; rather it is
a professional ethos that he or she has developed. Phrased another way, the
identity of the sophist–technical communicator can be seen not so much

as a subjectivity (one who possesses knowledge in the Platonic sense), but
rather as an intersubjectivity (one possessed of a certain ethos, or way of
acting within and among social realms). This intersubjectivity is not

assumable by rote and it cannot be taught through a Platonic curriculum

of disjointed courses; it must be developed instead by allowing students to
make the connections between their coursework and the social realm of

technical communication in practice. This development can be facilitated,
I believe, through self-conscious reflexivity.

Such reflexivity is comprised of an explicit engagement on behalf

of the student with the issue of what it means to be a practitioner of

technical communication. It can take the curricular form of retrospective

portfolios, capstone projects, student symposia, close instructor advising, or
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen if programs enact social engagement at other levels:
for instance if students already work extensively in local industry, or if individual courses
and pedagogical methods already emerge from local needs. These possibilities again
suggest the need for more in-depth, quantitative and qualitative research on the
individual contexts of certificate programs.
14
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even developmental journals; but the end goal of these activities should be
for students to self-consciously adopt the professional ethos of a technical

communicator within—and as shaped by—their specific social and cultural
contexts. To be sure, such reflexive practice is conceived here not as a
Platonic act of philosophical contemplation but as a sophistic act of

rhetorical engagement: each of these activities should be constructed with

a genuine audience, purpose, and context. Through these kinds of reflexive
activities, students are provided with the curricular space to make

developmental connections through social and discursive means. Although
it is not certain the extent to which the kind of reflective professional
development that I am sketching here is a part of current certificate

programs, it remains an intriguing question for future researchers, as well
as a compelling consideration for the design of any technical
communication curriculum.

Of course, technical communication certificate programs are not

completely unproblematic. While they are characteristically sophistic in

their flexibility, this feature is also suggests the possibility for misuse. Little
observes that the flexible nature of the certificate and its relative lack of
administrative oversight

could result in questions about its quality. Without the
application of standards, either legislated or mandated by
educational codes as they are for degrees, certificates may
not gain much acceptance as credentials for hiring or
promotion, especially beyond the regional area the
institution serves. (“Designing” 276)

To be sure, the kind of broad curricular standards that Little alludes to do
not exist. Despite Roy K. Turner and Kenneth T. Rainey’s expressed

optimism that an empirical examination of existing programs “would move
the profession a long way toward standardized essential competencies”

(222), research into the curricula of both baccalaureate (Harner and Rich)
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and certificate (Nugent, “Looking”) programs reveals very few areas of
curricular overlap that could support such nationwide standards.

Nonetheless, Little presents us with an important caution: by embracing

flexibility or location alone, it is possible for certificates to become simply

“value added” credentials that serve the most immediate material interests
of schools or students while failing to provide relevant preparation for the

situated practice of technical communication. Without broader standards,

the argument runs, what is to stop “anything goes” from becoming the sole
guiding principle for certificate programs?

Sophistic theory suggests a strategy for program design that I

believe addresses this possibility. Just as the sophists remain attentive to
their context and the particular needs of their audiences, certificate
programs should remain thoroughly attentive to the needs of their
stakeholders. Whether regional or national, whether individual or

collective, whether in the academy or in industry, many groups have a

legitimate stake in the construction of certificate programs: universities,

departments, students, instructors, administrators, neighboring academic

programs, local industry, professional groups, scholarly organizations, and
so on. In the continuing absence of broader curricular standards in

technical communication, soliciting steady feedback from such a broad
range of stakeholders may be the most effective check we have against
“anything goes” program configurations.

It may also be our best chance for building programs that are

successful—not just instrumentally, but also in terms of offering quality
instruction. Just as J. Blake Scott contends that the nomoi of the
community can be a viable source for ethics in the technical

communication practice and pedagogy (192–4), the standards of rigorous
and ethical instruction for certificate programs can emerge from the

negotiated claims of the stakeholders that they serve. While some of the
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commentary on certificates suggests that they are attentive to both

students (Worley) and local industry (Nugent, “Looking”) as stakeholder

groups, it remains to be seen what other groups are allowed to have a hand
in shaping certificate programs, how negotiations take place among those
groups, and how the dynamics of power affect the outcomes of such
negotiations.

Regardless of whether technical communication will eventually

enjoy the status of a modernist profession, playing to multiple stakeholder
audiences and balancing their competing interests remains our best (if

only) available guide in the absence of broader curricular standards, fixed
knowledges, and core competencies. More importantly, we should be

prepared for the possibility that, given the sophistic rhetorical character
and kairotic nature of technical communication, these kinds of

foundational standards may never emerge. As Savage notes, the “path of

professionalization for technical communication” may very well be “a blind
maze—many branches but with no way out to the goal we envision.”
(“Tricksters” 170). As an alternative to this, he implores,

Let us, rather than waging a tiresome and increasingly
frustrating war of position for professional status, consider
the possibility of teaching for a postmodern practice, a
navigating practice, like the wily Odysseus, not mastering
but negotiating continually shifting technologies,
institutions, discourses, and cultures. (“Tricksters” 189)

As I contend, the thoughtful design and implementation of certificate
programs should be seen as an important strategy for realizing the

alternative, sophistic conception of technical communication that Savage
illustrates.

Perhaps more radically, however, we may also want to consider that

the “alternative” Savage describes here is, in fact, no alternative at all. That
is, the instrumental success of technical communication as a profession
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and discipline may not just be a matter of placing new, postmodern

notions of professionalism alongside our received, modernist conceptions.

Instead, we may want to consider that all professions, academic disciplines,
and educational programs are always already constructed by the activities
of negotiation and navigation that Savage describes. We may want to

entertain the notion that all disciplines and professions are constituted
rhetorically (i.e. discursively), and further, sophistically (i.e. without

reference to an extra-discursive or transcendent reality). Lastly, we may

also want to consider that nomoi and the competing claims of stakeholders,
audiences, and communities are the only measures of ethical rectitude that
we will ever possess—not just within technical communication, but
anywhere. With the full articulation of these notions of sophistic

disciplinarity, professionalization, and ethics lying beyond the scope of the
present study, however, I offer these ideas only as possibilities here.

I hope I have made clear that I do not see the value of sophism as a

means to excuse program configurations that are convenient, but otherwise
indefensible. I also do not mean to suggest that we should give up on

seeking increased status for technical communication, that we should stop
trying to articulate its identity as a discipline or profession, or that we

should cede total control of our academic programs to a group of varied
interests. Rather, in offering a model of professional identity as an

alternative to those of market closure and fixity, I contend that sophistic
rhetoric suggests a more situated, more responsible, and even more

strategic, figuration for the technical communicator. My research on
certificates shows that they are consistent with a sophistic model of

programmatic flexibility, concern for local needs, and practical orientation.
However, the sophistic model also provides important cautions for the
design and administration of certificate programs. A sophistically

informed certificate program should remain socially engaged, and it should
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present opportunities for students to work in real social contexts. In

addition, a sophistically informed certificate program should be reflective:
it should present opportunities for students to reflexively and selfconsciously develop their professional ethos.

Again, I make no claims to transcendence or universality in the

research and interpretations I present here, and I hope that I have avoided
any of the familiar “god-trick” rhetorical techniques that would suggest
otherwise. I also hope that the information and discussion I have

presented here are useful—either for participants in conversations within

the field or for those considering the development of their own certificate
programs. Sophistic rhetorical theory, I believe, provides an invaluable
theoretical model—one that is both descriptive and prescriptive—for
building and understanding certificate programs in technical
communication.
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Appendix A:
Program Directory

The following are the U.S. academic institutions offering a certificate,

undergraduate degree or concentration, or graduate degree in technical or

professional writing/communication. The programs surveyed in this study
are noted (†).

Appalachian State University
Sanford Hall
Boone, NC 28608
Arcadia University
Department of English
S. Easton Rd.
Taylor 211
Glenside, PA 19038

†

Arizona State University
Multimedia Writing and Technical Communication
7001 E. Williams Field Rd.
Mesa, AZ 85204-2896

†

Auburn University
Department of English
9030 Haley Center
Auburn University, AL 36849-5203

†

Austin Community College
11928 Stonehollow
Austin, TX 78758-3190
Austin Peay State University
Department of Languages and Literature
PO Box 4487
Clarksville, TN 37044
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†

Bellevue Community College
Department of Business and Professional Development
10700 Northup Way
Bellevue, WA 98004-1416
Bentley College
Adamian Graduate Center 083
175 Forest Street
Waltham, MA 02452
Boise State University
Department of English
Boise, ID 83725-0399
Bowling Green State University
Department of English
Bowling Green, OH 43403-0001

†

Brigham Young University
English Department
Provo, UT 84602-0002

†

Brooklyn College
2900 Bedford Ave
Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889

†

California Polytechnic State University
Technical Communication Program
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407-0001

†

California State University Channel Islands
Department of English
Camarillo, CA 93012

†

California State University, Dominguez Hills
College of Extended and International Education
1000 E. Victoria St.
Carson, CA 90747-0001
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†

California State University, East Bay
Continuing and International Education
25800 Carlos Bee Blvd.
Hayward, CA 94542-3000

†

California State University, Fullerton
College Park, Suite 100
2600 Nutwood Ave.
Fullerton, CA 92834-6870

†

California State University, Long Beach
Department of English
1250 Bellflower Boulevard
Long Beach, CA 90840-0001

†

California State Universtiy, Chico
English Department
400 West First Street
Chico, CA 95929-0001

†

Carnegie Mellon University
Department of English
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

†

Cedarville University
251 Main Street
Cedarville, OH 45314-8564

†

Chicago State University
Department of English and Speech
9501 South King Drive, SCI 320
Chicago, IL 60628-1598

†

Christopher Newport University
Department of English
Newport News, VA 23601-3301
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Clemson University
Strode Tower
English Department
Clemson, SC 29634
†

Cleveland State University
Division of Continuing Education
2121 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115-2214

†

College of DuPage
Liberal Arts Division
425 Fawell Boulevard
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137-6599

†

College of Lake County
Technical Communication And Multimedia Programs
19351 West Washington Street
Grayslake, IL 60030-1198
Colorado State University
Department of Journalism and Technical Communication
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1785
Columbus State Community College
550 E. Spring St.
Columbus, OH 43216

†

DeAnza College
Department of Technical Writing
21250 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, CA 95014-5797
Delta College
English Division
1961 Delta Rd.
University Center, MI 48710-0001

145

†

Drexel University
Department of Culture and Communication
Philadelphia, PA 19104-2816

†

Duke University
Continuing Studies
Box 90700
Durham, NC 27708-0700

†

East Carolina University
Department of English
2100 Bate Building
Greenville, NC 27858-4353

†

Eastern Kentucky University
Case Annex 497
521 Lancaster Avenue
Richmond, KY 0475-3102

†

Eastern Michigan University
612 Pray Harrold Hall
Ypsilanti, MI 48197-2207

†

Eastern Washington University
Department of English
250 Patterson Hall
Cheney, WA 99004-2430
Elon University
Campus Box 2349
Elon, NC 27244
Fairfield University
1073 N. Benson Rd.
DMH 130
Fairfield, CT 06824-5195

146

Farmingdale State College
Knapp Hall
Farmingdale, NY 11735
†

Ferris State University
Department of Languages and Literature
820 Campus Drive
ASC 3080-A
Big Rapids, MI 49307-2225
Florida State University
Academic and Professional Program Services
Center for Professional Development
C3500 University Center
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2550
Francis Marion University
McNair 101-F
Florence, SC 29501
Gateway Technical College
1001 S. Main Street
Racine, WI 53403
George Mason University
Department of English
Robinson A 487
4400 University Drive, MSN 3E4
Fairfax, VA 22030

†

Georgia Southern University
Writing and Linguistics Department
1118 Newton Bldg.
P.O. Box 8026
Statesboro, GA 30460-0002
Hilbert College
5200 South Park Avenue
Hamburg, NY 14075
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†

Illinois Institute of Technology
3301 S. Dearborn
Chicago, IL 60616-2973
Illinois State University
English Department
Campus Box 4240
Normal, IL 61790-4240

†

Indiana University East
Whitewater Hall 254
2325 Chester Blvd.
Richmond, IN 47374-1289

†

Indiana University South Bend
Department of English
1700 Mishawaka Ave.
P.O. Box 7111
South Bend, IN 46634-7111

†

Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis
Technical Communication Program
799 W. Michigan St. ET 324F
Indianapolis, IN 46202-2896

†

Iowa State University
Department of English
203 Ross Hall
Ames, IA 50011-1201

†

James Madison University
Institute of Technical and Scientific Communication
MSC 2108
Harrisonburg, VA 22807-0002

†

Kansas State University
108-C English
Counseling Services Building
Manhattan, KS 66506-0305
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†

Kaplan University
6301 Kaplan University Ave.
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309-1905
Kennesaw State University
English Department, EB155
1000 Chastain Rd. #3301
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5588

†

King College
Department of Technical and Professional Communication
1350 King College Road
Bristol, TN 37620-2649
Kutztown University
Department of English
Lytle Hall
Kutztown, PA 19530

†

Lawrence Technological University
College of Arts and Sciences
21000 West Ten Mile Road
Southfield, MI 48075-1058
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
One University Place
Shreveport, LA 71115

†

Louisiana Tech University
School of Literature and Language
P.O. Box 3162
Ruston, LA 71272-0001

†

Madison Area Technical College
3550 Anderson Street
Room 246
Madison, WI 53704-2599
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†

Madonna University
English and Communication Arts
36600 Schoolcraft Road
Livonia, MI 48150-1176

†

Mercer University
Mercer University School of Engineering
1400 Coleman Avenue
Macon, GA 31207-0001

†

Metropolitan State College of Denver
Department of Technical Communication and Media
P.O. Box 173362
Campus Box 35
Denver, CO 80217-3362

†

Metropolitan State University
Suite 205, Energy Park Place
1380 Energy Lane
St. Paul, MN 55108-5253

†

Miami University
English Department
Bachelor Hall
Oxford, OH 45056-3506

†

Michigan Technological University
Department of Humanities
1400 Townsend Dr.
Houghton, MI 49930

†

Middlesex Community College
591 Springs Road
Bedford, MA 01730-1197

†

Milwaukee School of Engineering
1025 N. Broadway
Milwaukee, WI 53202-3109
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†

Minnesota State University, Mankato
Department of English
230 Armstrong Hall
Mankato, MN 56001-6079

†

Missouri University of Science and Technology
Department of English and Technical Communication
Rolla, MO 65409-0001

†

Missouri Western State University
222 Eder Hall
4525 Downs Dr.
St. Joseph, MO 64507-2294

†

Montana Tech of the University of Montana
PTC Department
Engineering Hall 208D
Butte, MT 59701-8997

†

Montgomery College
Department of Communications
20200 Observation Drive
Germantown, MD 20876-4067

†

Moraine Park Technical College
235 N. National Avenue
Fond du Lac, WI 54935-2884

†

Murray State University
Department of English and Philosophy
7C Faculty Hall
Murray, KY 42071
Nazareth College
4245 East Ave.
Rochester, NY 14618-3703
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†

New Jersey Institute of Technology
Department of Humanities
Newark, NJ 07102-1982

†

New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
Technical Communication Program
801 Leroy Place
Socorro, NM 87801-4750
New Mexico State University
English Department MSC 3E
P.O. Box 30001
Las Cruces, NM 88003

†

New York Institute of Technology
Department of English
Northern Blvd.
Old Westbury, NY 11568-1036

†

North Carolina State University at Raleigh
Department of English
Box 8105, NCSU
Raleigh, NC 27695-8105

†

Northeastern University
360 Huntington Ave.
270 Ryder Hall
Boston, MA 02115-5000
Northern Arizona University
English Department
Flagstaff, AZ 86011
Northern Illinois University
Department of English
DeKalb, IL 60115
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†

Oklahoma State University
OSU Department of English
205 Morrill Hall
Stillwater, OK 74078-0002
Old Dominion University
Department of English, BAL 5000
Norfolk, VA 23529

†

Orange Coast College
Department of Literature and Languages
2701 Fairview Rd.
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-5563
Penn State
College of Liberal Arts
143 Burrowes Building
University Park, PA 16802

†

Pikes Peak Community College
Department of English
5675 S. Academy Blvd.
Colorado Springs, CO 80906-5498

†

Pima Community College
West Campus
English Department
2202 West Anklam Rd.
Tucson, AZ 85709-0170

†

Pittsburg State University
426 Grubbs Hall
Pittsburg, KS 66762-7500

†

Polytechnic University
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
6 MetroTech Center
Brooklyn, NY 11201-2990
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Portland State University
Department of English
Portland, OR 97207-0751
†

Purdue University
Department of English
500 Oval Dr.
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2038

†

Radford University
English Department, 6935
Radford, VA 24142-0002

†

Regis University
Department of English
3333 Regis Boulevard
Denver, CO 80221-1099

†

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Department of Language, Literature, and Communication
110 Eighth Street
Troy, NY 12180-3590

†

Rhetoric and Writing @ Michigan State University
5 Olds Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824-1020

†

Rochester Institute of Technology
Department of Communication
College of Liberal Arts
Rochester, NY 14623-5698

†

Rutgers
Technical Writing Program
96 Davidson Road
Piscataway, NJ 08854-8062
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†

Sacramento State University
College of Continuing Education
3000 State University Drive East
Sacramento, CA 95819-6103

†

Saginaw Valley State University
Brown Hall 330
University Center, MI 48710-0001

†

San Diego State University
Department of Rhetoric and Writing Studies
5500 Campanile Dr.
San Diego, CA 92182-4452

†

San Francisco State University
Technical and Professional Writing Program
1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94132-4162

†

San José State University
Department of English
One Washington Square
San José, CA 95192-0001
Shepherd College
Department of English
P.O. Box 5000
Knutti Hall
Shepherdstown, WV 25443
Southeastern Louisiana University
English Department SLU 10861
Hammond, LA 70402

†

Southern Polytechnic State University
English, Technical Communication, and Media Arts
Marietta, GA 30060-2896
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St. Edward’s University
Box 103
3001 South Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78704
State University of NY Institute of Technology
Rt. 12 North Horatio St
Utica, NY 13504
Stevens Institute of Technology
1 Castle Point on Hudson
Morton 208
Hoboken, NJ 07030
SUNY–Cortland
English Department
Old Main, Room 115-A
Cortland, NY 13045
Tennessee Technological University
English Department
Box 5053
Cookeville, TN 38505
Texas A&M University
Writing Programs Office
234 Blocker Bldg.
College Station, TX 77843-4227
Texas State University
Department of English
San Marcos, TX 78666
†

Texas Tech University
English Department
P. O. Box 43091
Lubbock, TX 79409-0001
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†

Three Rivers Community College
TRCC Humanities and Performing Arts Division
2080 Three Rivers Blvd.
Poplar Bluff, MO 63901-2350
Towson University
College of Graduate Studies
8000 York Road
Towson, MD 21252
Troy University, Montgomery Campus
Building 136, Room 104
241 Montgomery ST
Montgomery, AL 36104
University of Akron
Department of English
Olin Hall 301
Akron, OH 44325-1906

†

University of Alabama in Huntsville
English Department
Huntsville, AL 35899-0001

†

University of Arkansas at Little Rock
Department of Rhetoric and Writing
2801 S. University Ave.
Little Rock, Arkansas 72204-1099

†

University of California Berkeley Extension
1995 University Ave. - Suite 110
Berkeley, CA 94704-7000

†

University of California San Diego Extension
9500 Gilman Dr - MC 0170A
La Jolla, CA 92093

†

University of California Riverside Extension
Riverside, CA 92521-0112
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†

University of California Santa Cruz Extension
Cupertino Campus
Business and Management Department
10420 Bubb Road
Cupertino, CA 95014-4150

†

University of Central Florida
Department of English
Orlando, FL 32816-1346

†

University of Colorado at Denver
Department of Communication
P. O. Box 173364 - Campus Box 176
Denver, CO 80217-3364

†

University of Delaware
University of Delaware Department of English
Office 135 Memorial
Newark, DE 19716-5600
University of Hartford
200 Bloomfield Avenue
West Hartford, CT 06117
University of Hawaii at Manoa
English Department
1733 Donaghho Road
Honolulu, HI 96822

†

University of Houston–Downtown
One Main Street
Suite S-1045
Houston, TX 77002-1001

†

University of Massachusetts Amherst
481 Bartlett Hall
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003
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University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
UMD - Group 1, Room 341
285 Old Westport Road
North Dartmouth, MA 02747-2300
†

University of Massachusetts Lowell
Department of English
One University Avenue
Lowell, MA 01854-5096

†

University of Michigan–Flint
English Department
303 E. Kearsley Street
Flint, MI 48502-1950

†

University of Minnesota
64 Classroom Office Building
Buford Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55108-1004

†

University of Minnesota Rochester
111 South Broadway
Rochester, MN 55904-4945

†

University of Nebraska at Omaha
English Department - ASH 189P
Omaha, NE 68182-0175
University of Nevada Las Vegas
Department of English
4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455011
Las Vegas, NV 89154-5011
University of New Mexico
One University of NM
Department of English MSC 03 2170
Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001
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University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Department of English
276F Fretwell Building
Charlotte, NC 28223-0001
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Department of English
601 S. College Road
Wilmington, NC 28403
University of Northern Iowa
117 Baker
Mail Code 0502
Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0502
University of Pittsburgh
526 CL/English Department
4200 5th Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
†

University of South Florida
Department of English, CPR 107
4202 E. Fowler Avenue
Tampa, FL 33620-9951
University of Southern California–Santa Barbara
Writing Program
South Hall 1520
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3010

†

University of Tennessee
Department of English
301 McClung Tower
Knoxville, TN 37996-0001

†

University of Texas at San Antonio
Department of Communication
One UTSA Circle
San Antonio, TX 78249-0643
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†

University of Washington
14 Loew Hall, Box 352195
Seattle, WA 98195-0005

†

University of Wisconsin–Madison
Department of Engineering Professional Development
432 North Lake Street
Madison, WI 53706-1498

†

University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Department of English
Curtin Hall
Milwaukee, WI 53201-0413

†

University of Wisconsin-Stout
150C Harvey Hall
Menomonie, WI 54751-0790
Utah State University
English Department,
3200 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3200
Virginia Tech
Department of English, 0112
Blacksburg, VA 24061
Washington State University Vancouver
Department of English
14204 NE Salmon Creek Ave.
Vancouver, WA, 98686-9600
Washington State University
Department of English
Avery Hall
Pullman, WA 99164
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†

Washtenaw Community College
WCC Department of English/Writing
4800 E. Huron River Dr.
PO Box 1610
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1610

†

Weber State University
1201 University Circle
Department of English
Ogden, UT 84408-1201
West Chester University
Main Hall 530
West Chester, PA 19383

†

West Texas A&M University
Department of English
Box 60908
Canyon, TX 79016-0001
West Virginia University
230 Stansbury Hall
Morgantown, WV 26506
Western Wisconsin Technical College
304 Sixth Street N.
La Crosse, WI 54601
Widener University
One University Place
Chester, PA 19013-5792
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
ME Department
100 Institute Rd
Worcester, MA 01609
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†

Wright State University
Department of English
Dayton, OH 45435-0002
Youngstown State University
Department of English
One University Plaza
Youngstown, OH, 44555
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Appendix B:
Survey Instrument
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Appendix C:
Survey Cover Letter
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Appendix D:
Survey Reminder Postcard
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